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Many classical models of CEO compensation consider only a single period, or multiple
periods but a single terminal consumption. However, the optimal static contract may be inef-
fective in a dynamic world. In reality, securities given to incentivize the CEO may lose their
power over time: if firm value declines, options fall out-of-the-money and bear little sensitivity
to the stock price. The CEO may be able to engage in private saving, to achieve a higher future
income than intended by the contract, in turn reducing his effort incentives. Single-period con-
tracts can encourage the CEO to engage in short-termism, i.e., inflate the current stock price at
the expense of long-run value. In addition to the above challenges, a dynamic setting provides
opportunities to the firm —it can reward effort with future rather than current pay.
This paper analyzes a dynamic model that allows for all of the above complications, which
are likely important features in reality. We take an optimal contracting approach that allows for
fully history-dependent contracts without restrictions to particular contractual forms. The key
challenge of a dynamic setting with risk aversion, private saving and short-termism is that the
contract is typically very complex and can only be solved numerically, which makes it diffi cult
to see the intuition and understand which features of the setting are driving which aspects of
the contract. Our main methodological contribution is to achieve a surprisingly simple optimal
contract. The model’s closed form solutions allow the economic forces behind the contract to
be transparent, its economic implications to be clear, and a simple practical implementation
using the standard instruments of cash and stock.
In the full model, the CEO engages in effort, private saving and short-termism, and the
contract must achieve incentive compatibility in all three actions. The model’s tractability
allows us to see clearly the effect of switching these actions on and off, and thus isolate the role
that each plays in determining the contract.
In the simplest model, the CEO chooses only effort. In the optimal contract, log pay is a
linear function of current and all past stock returns. Therefore, the rewards for exerting effort
to increase the current return are spread over all future periods, to achieve intertemporal risk-
sharing. The return in any given period affects log pay in all future periods to the same degree
—the first-period return has the same effect on second-period log pay as it does on first-period
log pay. Moreover, in an infinite-horizon model, this sensitivity is constant across periods. Log
pay is affected by returns in all past periods to the same degree —the first-period return and
the second-period return have the same effect on second-period log pay. With a finite horizon,
the sensitivity is increasing over time, as found empirically by Gibbons and Murphy (1992).
Log pay is more sensitive to current than past returns, and the sensitivity to the current return
intensifies as the CEO becomes older. This is because there are fewer periods over which to
spread the reward for effort, and so the reward in the current period must increase. This effect
is absent in the infinite-horizon model. We thus generate a similar prediction to the model of
Gibbons and Murphy, but without invoking career concerns.
When the CEO has the possibility of private saving, the contract must remove his incentives
to undo the contract by doing so. Even if his compensation were flat, he would have a motive
to save if his own level of impatience differs from that of the aggregate economy, as the latter
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determines the interest rate. Moreover, the presence of incentive compensation exposes him
to risk which he may wish to insure against. We show that, while the contract sensitivity is
affected by the model horizon, it is unaffected by whether the CEO can save privately. Instead,
the possibility of private saving affects the level of pay, causing it to increase faster over time.
Rising pay effectively saves for the CEO, removing the incentive for him to do so privately.
That the wage should rise with tenure provides a potential explanation for seniority-based pay,
which differs from existing explanations based on internal labor markets. The growth rate of
consumption is increasing in the level of incentives and is thus faster for CEOs with stronger
incentives (e.g., due to more severe agency problems), and accelerates over time in a finite
model where incentives rise over time. However, while the possibility of private saving affects
the level of pay, it has no affect on the strength of incentives.
We finally allow the CEO to engage in short-termism / myopia, e.g., by changing account-
ing policies or scrapping positive-NPV projects. The contract must change in several ways
to prevent such behavior. When myopia is infeasible, the CEO’s post-retirement income is
independent of firm performance after departure, since he cannot affect it. When myopia is
feasible, he can now affect post-retirement returns by engaging in short-termism prior to de-
parture. Thus his post-retirement income must become sensitive to firm returns, to deter such
actions. In addition, the contract sensitivity now rises over time, even in an infinite-horizon
model. The CEO benefits from short-termism as it boosts current pay, but the cost is only suf-
fered in the future and thus has a discounted effect. An increasing sensitivity offsets the effect
of discounting by ensuring that the CEO loses more dollars in the future than he gains today.
The rate of this increase and the extent of the CEO’s exposure to returns after retirement are
greater if the CEO is more impatient. Moreover, these direct changes to the sensitivity of the
contract further induce indirect changes to the level of pay. As the sensitivity rises to deter
myopia, the CEO is exposed to greater risk, in turn requiring higher pay to compensate.
The optimal contract can be implemented in the following simple manner. When appointed,
the CEO is given a “Dynamic Incentive Account”(“DIA”): a portfolio of which a given fraction
is invested in the firm’s stock and the remainder in (interest-bearing) cash. Mathematically,
the fraction of pay in stock equals the dependence of log pay on the stock return, and so it
represents the contract’s sensitivity. As time evolves, and firm value changes, this portfolio
is constantly rebalanced to ensure the fraction of stock remains suffi cient to induce effort at
minimum risk to the CEO. A fall in the share price reduces the equity in the account below
the required fraction; this is addressed by using cash in the account to purchase stock. If the
stock appreciates, some equity can be sold without falling below the threshold, to reduce the
CEO’s risk.
The following numerical example illustrates the role of rebalancing. The CEO is considering
whether to voluntarily forgo one week’s annual leave to work on a project that will increase firm
value by 10%, or take his entitled holiday which is worth 6% of his salary to him. (The higher
the salary, the more the holiday is worth since he can spend his salary on holiday.) If salary
is $10m, the holiday is worth $600,000. If the CEO has $6m of stock, working will increase its
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value by 10%, or $600,000, thus deterring the holiday. Therefore, his $10m salary will comprise
$6m of stock and $4m of cash. Now assume that the firm’s stock price has suddenly halved,
so that his stock is worth $3m. His total salary is $7m and the holiday is worth $420,000,
but working will increase his $3m stock by only $300,000. To induce effort, the CEO’s gains
from working must be $420,000. This requires him to have $4.2m of stock, and is achieved by
using $1.2m of cash in the account to purchase new stock. Importantly, the $1.2m additional
equity is not given to the CEO for free, but accompanied by a reduction in cash to $2.8m. This
addresses a concern with the current practice of restoring incentives after stock price declines
by repricing options —the CEO is rewarded for failure.
The DIA also features gradual vesting: the CEO can only withdraw a percentage of the
account in each period. This has three roles. First, it achieves consumption smoothing. Second,
it addresses the effort problem in future periods, by ensuring that the CEO has suffi cient equity
in the future to induce effort. These two roles exist even if short-termism is not feasible, and
requires vesting to be gradual during the CEO’s employment. Third, it addresses the myopia
problem in the current period, by preventing the CEO from inflating earnings and cashing
out. This role requires vesting to be gradual even after the CEO retires. Gradual vesting is
a more effective solution to short-termism than the clawbacks recently proposed. Clawbacks
are a “cure”to recoup compensation that was paid out prematurely; gradual vesting achieves
“prevention”of the premature payouts in the first place. While the former requires an explicit
decision by the board and is costly to implement, the latter allows the contract to run on
auto-pilot and requires no board involvement after the contract is set up.
In sum, the DIA has two key features, which each achieve separate objectives. State-
dependent rebalancing ensures that the CEO always exerts effort in the current period. Time-
dependent vesting ensures that the CEO has suffi cient equity in future periods to induce effort,
and abstains from myopia in the current period. Critical to this simple implementation is the
fact that, even though consumption depends on the entire history of returns, the ratio of con-
sumption to promised wealth (and thus the vesting fraction) and the level of incentives (and thus
the fraction of stock to which the account must be rebalanced) are both history-independent.
In particular, the wealth in the account is a suffi cient state variable for consumption in that
period; the sequence of past returns that generated that level of wealth is immaterial.
The model thus offers theoretical guidance on how compensation might be reformed to
address the problems that manifested in the recent crisis, such as short-termism and weak
incentives after stock price declines. A number of commentators (e.g., Bebchuk and Fried
(2004), Holmstrom (2005), Bhagat and Romano (2009)) have argued that lengthening vesting
horizons may deter myopia. We provide a theoretical framework that allows to analyze and
augment these verbal arguments (in particular, showing that gradual vesting is optimal even if
short-termism is not feasible). While those papers focus only on lengthening vesting horizons,
the DIA is critically different as it involves not only delayed vesting but also rebalancing.
Delayed vesting alone only solves the myopia problem and does not ensure that the CEO’s
effort incentives are replenished over time —even if the CEO must hold onto his options, they
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have little incentive effect if they are out of the money. Moreover, in contrast to the above
verbal proposals, we formally solve for the vesting fraction in a number of cases to study the
optimal horizon of incentives — in particular, it is not always the case that lengthening the
vesting horizon (i.e., reducing the vesting fraction) improves effi ciency. In an infinite-horizon
model, the vesting fraction is constant over time, and lower if private saving is possible. The
agent wishes to save to insure himself against the risk imposed by equity pay; a lower vesting
fraction provides automatic saving and removes these incentives. In a finite-horizon model,
the fraction is increasing over time —since the CEO has fewer periods over which to enjoy his
wealth, he should consume a greater percentage in later periods.
Other theories also formally model the optimal vesting horizon. The critical difference is
that, in those papers, vesting and rebalancing are the same event — the CEO can only sell
his securities (i.e., rebalance his portfolio) when they vest. Those papers point out that early
vesting is sometimes desirable —in Chaigneau (2009) and Peng and Roell (2009), it allows the
CEO to reduce his risk by trading his stock for cash; in Brisley (2006) and Bhattacharyya and
Cohn (2010), this risk reduction encourages the CEO to take effi cient risky projects. Thus,
there is a trade-off between the benefits of early rebalancing and the costs of early vesting. In
the first three papers, firms choose short-vesting stock to permit early rebalancing, even though
it leads to some myopia. Brisley analyzes options where rebalancing is only necessary upon
strong performance, since only in-the-money options subject the CEO to risk. Therefore, as
in our model, state-dependent rebalancing is effi cient. Since rebalancing and vesting are the
same event in Brisley (options can only be sold when they vest), this requires state-dependent
vesting. Indeed, Bettis et al. (2010) document that performance-based (i.e., state-dependent)
vesting is increasingly popular, where vesting is accelerated upon high returns.1 However, this
may induce the CEO to inflate the stock price (an action not featured in Brisley) and cash out.
Here, vesting and rebalancing are separate events, allowing risk reduction without inducing
myopia. High returns permit sales of equity (i.e., rebalancing) but critically the proceeds
remain in the account (vesting is not accelerated) in case the returns are subsequently reversed.
Our framework uses two separate instruments —vesting and rebalancing —to achieve the two
separate goals of inducing effort and deterring myopia without any trade-off.
This paper is related to the dynamic agency literature, such as DeMarzo and Sannikov
(2006), DeMarzo and Fishman (2007), He (2009), Sannikov (2008), Biais et al. (2007, 2010),
Garrett and Pavan (2009, 2010), and Zhu (2011). The optimal contract in these papers is
typically highly complex (except if risk-neutrality is assumed, in which case private saving is a
non-issue), and they do not incorporate short-termism. Lacker and Weinberg (1989), Goldman
and Slezak (2006), Peng and Roell (2009), Sun (2009), and Hermalin andWeisbach (2011) study
short-termism (in the form of manipulation) in a static setting. To our knowledge, He (2011) is
the only other dynamic model featuring effort, myopia and private saving. His setup requires a
discrete action choice and linear cost functions, private borrowing is ruled out, and the contract
1State-dependent vesting is also featured in the “Bonus Bank”advocated by Stern Stewart, where the amount
of the bonus that the executive can withdraw depends on the total bonuses accumulated in the bank.
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can only be solved numerically. This paper considers a fairly general setting featuring all three
decisions, yet still obtain a closed-form contract which allows clear economic intuition and simple
implementation. We do so by using the framework of Edmans and Gabaix (2011a) (“EG”)
which allows us to deliver closed-form contracts in a multi-period setting; however, EG restrict
the CEO to consume in the final period only and thus cannot study private saving or short-
termism, nor do they consider how to implement the contract. Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987)
similarly have only terminal consumption. Allowing for intermediate consumption significantly
complicates the problem. If the agent cannot save privately, the principal must solve for how
to redistribute payments optimally over time to minimize the cost, creating extra optimality
conditions. If the agent can save privately, the principal must solve for how to deter him
from redistributing consumption to time periods with higher marginal utility, creating extra
constraints.
That the optimal contract exhibits memory (i.e., current pay depends on past output) was
first derived in Lambert (1983) and Rogerson (1985), who consider a two-period model where
the agent only chooses effort. We extend it to a multi-period model where the agent can also
save and inflate earnings. Moreover, the execution of the contract through an incentive account
and thus wealth- rather than pay-based compensation allows a memory-dependent contract to
be implemented simply. Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) note that a “disappointing implication
of [memory-dependence] is that the long-term contract will be very complex,”which appears to
contradict the relative simplicity of real-life contracts. This complexity is indeed unavoidable
if the CEO is rewarded exclusively through new flows of pay, as these flows will have to depend
on the entire history of past outcomes.2 Importantly, our contract can be implemented with a
wealth-based account rather than with flow pay. A fall in the share price reduces the CEO’s
wealth and thus his entire path of future consumption. Future consumption is thus sensitive to
past returns without requiring new flows of pay to be history-dependent.
In allowing for private saving, the paper makes an additional methodological contribution.
To our knowledge, it is the first to derive suffi cient conditions to guarantee the validity of the
first-order approach to solve a multi-period agency problem with private saving and borrowing.3
The first-order approach replaces the agent’s incentive constraints against complex multi-period
deviations with weaker local constraints (first-order conditions), with the hope that the solution
to the relaxed problem satisfies all constraints.4 This method is often valid if private saving is
impossible (hence the one-shot deviation principle), but problematic when the agent can engage
in joint deviations to save and shirk. This is because saving insures against future shocks to
income and thus reduces effort incentives. Our technique involves linearizing the agent’s utility
2While long-term incentive plans (LTIPs) are used in practice and relatively simple, they typically depend
on only a few years of performance rather than the entire history of performance as suggested by the model.
3Abraham, Koehne, and Pavoni (2011) provide suffi cient conditions for the first-order approach with private
saving and borrowing in a two-period model, but these conditions are not suffi cient for more than two periods.
4Another method of verifying the validity of the first-order approach is to verify global incentive compatibility
of each individual solution numerically rather than finding conditions on primitives that ensure validity. For
example, see Werning (2001), Dittmann and Maug (2007) and Dittmann and Yu (2010). See also Kocherlakota
(2004) for the analytical challenges of dynamic agency problems with private savings.
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function and showing that, if the cost of effort is suffi ciently convex, the linear utility function is
concave in leisure (it is automatic that there is no incentive to save under linear utility). Since
the actual utility function is concave, linearized utility is an upper bound for the agent’s actual
utility. Thus, since there is no profitable deviation under a linear utility function, there is no
profitable deviation under the actual utility function either. This technique may be applicable
in other agency theories to verify the suffi ciency of the first-order approach.
This paper is organized as follows. Section I presents the model setup and Section II derives
the optimal contract when the CEO has logarithmic utility, as this version of the model is most
tractable. Section III shows that the key results continue to hold under general CRRA utility
and autocorrelated noise. It also provides a full justification of the contract: it derives suffi cient
conditions that ensure that the agent will not undertake global deviations, and shows that the
principal does not want to implement a different effort level. Section IV extends the model to
allow for myopia, and Section V concludes. The Appendix A contains main proofs, and the
Internet Appendix contains further peripheral material.
I. The Core Model
We consider a multiperiod model featuring a firm (also referred to as the “principal”) which
employs a CEO (“agent”). The firm pays a terminal dividend Dτ (“earnings”) in the final
period τ , given by
Dτ = X exp
(
τ∑
t=1
(a t + η t)
)
, (1)
where X represents baseline firm size and a t ∈ [0, ā] is the agent’s action (“effort”). The action
a t is broadly defined to encompass any decision that improves firm value but is personally
costly to the manager. Low a t can refer to shirking, diverting cash flows or extracting private
benefits. η t is noise, which is independent across periods, has a log-concave density, and is
bounded above and below by η and η̄. (Section A allows for autocorrelated noises).
The goal of this paper is to achieve a tractable contract in a dynamic setting, to allow clear
implications. Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) show that tractability can be obtained under the
joint assumptions of exponential utility, a financial cost of effort, continuous time and Gaussian
noise. We wish to allow for general noise distributions, decreasing absolute risk aversion (given
empirical evidence), discrete time (for clarity) and non-financial effort costs. Many actions do
not involve a monetary expenditure; moreover, as we will discuss, a multiplicative rather than
financial cost of effort is necessary to generate empirically consistent predictions. We thus use
the framework of EG who achieve tractability without the above assumptions by specifying
that, in each period t, the agent privately observes η t before choosing his action a t. This
timing assumption forces the incentive constraints to hold state-by-state (i.e., for every possible
realization of η t) and thus tightly restricts the set of admissible contracts, leading to a simple
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solution to the principal’s problem.5 The timing is also featured in models where the CEO sees
total output before deciding how much to divert (Lacker and Weinberg (1989), DeMarzo and
Fishman (2007), Biais et al. (2007)), and where the CEO observes the “state of nature”before
choosing effort (Harris and Raviv (1979), Sappington (1983) and Baker (1992), and Prendergast
(2002)). Note that it does not render the CEO immune to risk —in every period, except the
final one, his action is followed by noise. Appendix B shows that the contract has the same
form in continuous time, where η and a are simultaneous.
After action at is taken, the principal observes a public signal of firm value, given by:
St = X exp
(
t∑
s=1
(as + ηs)
)
.
The incremental news contained in St, over and above the information known in period t − 1
(and thus contained in St−1) can be summarized by rt = lnSt − lnSt−1, i.e.,
rt = at + ηt. (2)
With a slight abuse of terminology, we call rt the firm’s “return”.6 By observing St, the principal
learns rt, but not its components at and ηt. The agent’s strategy is a function at(r1, . . . rt−1, ηt)
that specifies how his action depends on the current noise and the return history. After St (and
thus rt) is publicly observed, the principal pays the agent yt. We allow for a history-dependent
contract in which pay yt(r1, . . . rt) depends on the entire history of returns.7
Having received income yt, the agent consumes ct and saves (yt − ct) at the continuously
compounded risk-free rate R. The agent may borrow as well as save, i.e., (yt − ct) may be
negative. Such borrowing and saving are unobserved by the principal. Following a standard
argument (see, e.g., Cole and Kocherlakota (2001)), we can restrict attention to contracts in
which the agent chooses not to save or borrow in equilibrium, i.e., ct = yt.8 Any contract in
5Edmans and Gabaix (2011b) use this framework to achieve tractability in a market equilibrium model of
CEO compensation under risk aversion.
6rt is the actual increase in the expected dividend as a result of the action and noise at time t. Given rational
expectations, the innovation in the stock return is the unexpected increase in the stock price. In turn, the stock
price is the discounted expected dividend and includes the expected future effort levels. Assuming zero risk
premium for simplicity, the stock price is thus:
Pt = X exp
(
t∑
s=1
(as + ηs) + (τ − t) (a∗t −R+ lnE [eηt ])
)
,
where R is the risk-free rate. Therefore, the firm’s actual log return is lnPt − lnPt−1 = rt − a∗t +R− lnE[eηt ].
7A fully general contract can involve the income yt depending on messages sent by the agent regarding ηt.
We later derive a suffi cient condition under which the optimal contract implements a fixed action, a , in every
period. Hence, on the equilibrium path, there is a one to one correspondence between rt and ηt, which makes
messages redundant: see EG for a formal proof. We allow the contract to depend on messages when providing
the optimality of a fixed target action in Section C. Similarly, we restrict the analysis to deterministic contracts;
EG show that assuming that noise has a log-concave distribution (in addition to non-increasing absolute risk
aversion, which we have) is suffi cient to rule out stochastic contracts.
8As is standard, the CEO can save in the risk-free rate but not the stock, otherwise the CEO would be able
to undo the contract and give himself a flat salary. Insider trading is illegal in nearly all countries.
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which the CEO chooses to save to achieve a different consumption profile can be replaced by
an equivalent contract providing the same consumption profile directly, so there is no loss of
generality in focusing on contracts in which there is no private saving. Note this means that (as
is standard) we are only uniquely solving for the agent’s consumption profile, not his income
profile. It could be that the principal could implement the same consumption profile with a
different income profile, and the agent would voluntarily choose to save away from this income
profile to achieve exactly the consumption profile intended by the agent.
The agent’s per-period utility over consumption ct ∈ [0,∞) and effort at is given by
u (cth(at)) , (3)
where g (a) = − lnh (a), the utility cost of taking action a, is an increasing, convex function. u is
a CRRA utility function with relative risk aversion coeffi cient γ > 0, i.e., u (x) = x1−γ/ (1− γ)
if γ 6= 1, and u (x) = ln x for γ = 1.
The agent lives in periods 1 through T ≤ τ and retires after period L ≤ T . After retirement,
the firm replaces him with a new CEO and continues to contract optimally.9 The agent discounts
future utility at rate ρ, so that his total discounted utility is given by:
U =
T∑
t=1
ρtu(cth(at)). (4)
As in Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier (2009), effort has a multiplicative effect on both CEO
utility (equation (3)) and firm earnings (equation (1)). Multiplicative preferences (u (ct, at) =
u (cth(at))) consider private benefits as a normal good (i.e., the utility they provide is increasing
in consumption), consistent with the treatment of most goods and services in consumer theory.
They are also common in macroeconomic models: in particular, they are necessary for labor
supply to be constant over time as wages rise; with additive preferences, leisure falls to zero as
the wage increases.10 With a multiplicative production function, the dollar benefits of working
are higher for larger firms.11 Under the literal interpretation of a as effort, initiatives can be
“rolled out”across the entire firm and thus have a greater effect in a larger company; under the
interpretation of cash flow diversion, a large firm has more resources to steal.12 The manager
thus has a linear effect on the firm’s stock return. Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier (2009) show
that multiplicative specifications are necessary to deliver empirically consistent predictions for
the scaling of various incentive measures with firm size.
9This assumption means that at = ā for t > L. However, it could easily be weakened. The stock return after
the CEO’s retirement is driven only by deviations in the successor’s effort level from the market’s expectations
(plus noise), so any publicly observed contract would have the same effect.
10Bennardo, Chiappori and Song (2010) show that a multiplicative utility function can rationalize perks.
11This is similar to Gabaix and Landier (2008), where CEO talent has a multiplicative effect on firm value.
12See Bennedsen, Perez-Gonzalez, and Wolfenzon (2010) for empirical evidence that CEOs have the same
percentage effect on firm value, regardless of firm size.
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The principal is risk-neutral and uses discount rate R. Her objective function is thus:
max
(at,t=1,...L),(yt,t=1,...T )
E
[
e−RτDτ −
T∑
t=1
e−Rtyt
]
i.e., the expected discounted dividend, minus expected pay. The individual rationality (IR)
constraint is that the agent achieves his reservation utility of u, i.e.,
E
[
T∑
t=1
ρtu(cth(at))
]
= u.
The incentive compatibility constraints require that any deviation (in either the action or
consumption) by the agent reduces his utility, i.e.,
E
[
T∑
t=1
ρtu(ĉth(ât))
]
≤ u
for all alternative effort strategies (ât, t = 1, . . . L) and feasible consumption strategies (ĉt, t = 1, . . . T ) .
A consumption strategy is feasible if it satisfies the budget constraint
T∑
t=1
e−Rtct ≤
T∑
t=1
e−Rtyt.
We use the notation Ea and E â to highlight that the agent’s effort strategy affects the proba-
bility distribution over return paths.
The problem is complex because contracts are history-dependent, the agent can privately
save, and the principal must choose the optimal effort level. Our solution strategy is as fol-
lows. We first consider a deterministic (but possibly time-varying) sequence of target actions
(a∗t , t = 1, ..., L) and conjecture that the optimal contract involves binding local constraints.
Following this conjecture we (i) derive the necessary local constraints that a candidate contract
must satisfy in Section A; (ii) find the cheapest contract that satisfies these constraints (Theo-
rem 1 in Section B) and show that the constraints bind (Theorem 2 in Section A); (iii) derive a
suffi cient condition under which the candidate contract is also fully incentive-compatible, i.e.,
prevents global deviations (Theorem 3 in Section B); (iv) verify that if firm size X is suffi ciently
large, the optimal contract indeed involves a deterministic path of target actions: the highest
effort level a∗t = a is implemented in each period (Theorem 4 in Section C).
Note that we do not require part (iv) and Theorem 4 if we wish to focus on implementing a
given sequence of target actions (the first stage of Grossman and Hart (1983)) rather than also
determining the optimal effort level (the second stage of Grossman and Hart). Indeed, many
contracting papers focus exclusively on solving for the optimal contract to implement a given
effort level, rather than jointly solving for the optimal action (see, e.g., Dittmann and Maug
(2007), Dittmann, Maug, and Spalt (2010)) given the substantial complexity of the latter.
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II. Log Utility
A. Local Constraints
A candidate contract must satisfy two local constraints. The effort (EF) constraint ensures
that the agent exerts the target effort level (at = a∗t ). The private savings (PS) constraint
ensures that the agent consumes the full income provided by the contract (ct = yt). To highlight
the effect of allowing for private savings on the contract, we also consider a version of the model
in which private savings are impossible (i.e., the principal can monitor savings), and so the PS
constraint is not imposed.
Consider an arbitrary contract (yt, t = 1, . . . T ), a consumption strategy (ct, t = 1, . . . T ) and
an effort strategy (at, t = 1, . . . L) . Recall that yt and ct depend on the entire history (r1, . . . rt)
and at depends on (r1, . . . rt−1, ηt). To capture history-dependence, Et denotes the expectation
conditional on (r1, . . . rt). We first address the EF constraint and consider a local deviation in
the action at after history (r1, . . . rt−1, ηt). The effect on CEO utility is
Et
[
∂U
∂rt
∂rt
∂at
+
∂U
∂at
]
.
Since ∂rt/∂at = 1 and ∂U/∂at = ρtcth′(at)u′(cth(at)), the EF constraint is:
EF : Et
[
∂U
∂rt
]
= ρtct(−h′(at))u′(cth(at)), at ∈ (0, a) (5)
Et
[
∂U
∂rt
]
≥ ρtct(−h′(at))u′(cth(at)), at = a.
We next consider the PS constraint. If the CEO saves a small amount dt in period t and
invests it until t+ 1, his utility increases to the leading order by:
−Et
[
∂U
∂ct
]
dt + Et
[
∂U
∂ct+1
]
eRdt.
To deter private saving or borrowing, this change should be zero to the leading order, i.e.,
PS : ρth(at)u′(cth(at)) = Et
[
ρt+1eRh(at+1)u
′(ct+1h(at+1))
]
. (6)
This is the standard Euler equation for consumption smoothing: discounted marginal utility
eRtρth(at)u
′(cth(at)) is a martingale. Intuitively, if it were not a martingale, the agent would
privately reallocate consumption to the time periods with higher marginal utility.
The Euler equation contrasts with the “Inverse Euler Equation” (IEE), which applies to
agency problems without the possibility of private saving and thus the PS constraint, when
utility is additively separable in consumption and effort (e.g., Rogerson (1985) and Farhi and
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Werning (2009)). In our model, utility becomes additive if u(x) = ln x, and the IEE is:
IEE: ρ−tct = Et
[
e−Rρ−t−1ct+1
]
. (7)
The inverse of the agent’s discounted marginal utility e−Rtρ−tct, which equals the marginal
cost of delivering utility to the agent, is a martingale. If (7) did not hold, the principal would
shift the agent’s utility to periods with a lower marginal cost of delivering it. This argument is
invalid for γ 6= 1, because the agent’s marginal cost of effort depends on his consumption when
utility is nonadditive.
B. The Contract
We now derive the cheapest contract that satisfies the local constraints. We first consider
log utility as the expressions are most tractable, since the agent consumes the same amount
in each period. In addition, it allows us to consider the model both with and without the PS
constraint, since with log utility, the IEE applies in the case where there is no PS constraint.
Section III considers γ 6= 1.
Theorem 1 (Log utility.) The cheapest contract that satisfies the local constraints and imple-
ments at = a∗t ∀ t is as follows. In each period t, the CEO is paid a compensation ct which
satisfies:
ln ct = ln c0 +
t∑
s=1
θsrs +
t∑
s=1
ks, (8)
where θs and ks are constants. The sensitivity θs is given by
θs =
{
g′(a∗s)
1+ρ+...+ρT−s for s ≤ L,
0 for s > L.
(9)
If private saving is impossible, the constant ks is given by:
ks = R + ln ρ− lnE[eθs(a
∗
s+η)]. (10)
If private saving is possible, ks is given by:
ks = R + ln ρ+ lnE[e
−θs(a∗s+η)]. (11)
The initial condition c0 is chosen to give the agent his reservation utility u.
Heuristic proof. Appendix A contains a full proof; here we present a heuristic proof in a
simple case that gives the key intuition. We consider L = T = 2, ρ = 1, R = 0, a∗1 = a
∗
2 = a
∗
and impose the PS constraint. We wish to show that the optimal contract is given by:
ln c1 = g
′ (a∗)
r1
2
+ κ1, ln c2 = g
′ (a∗)
(r1
2
+ r2
)
+ κ1 + k2 (12)
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for some constants κ1 (the equivalent of ln c0 + k1 in the Theorem) and k2 that make the IR
constraint bind.
Step 1: Optimal log-linear contract
We first solve the problem in a restricted class where contracts are log-linear, i.e.:
ln c1 = θ1r1 + κ1, ln c2 = θ21r1 + θ2r2 + κ1 + k2 (13)
for some constants θ1, θ21, θ2, κ1, k2. This first step is not necessary but clarifies the economics,
and is helpful in more complex cases to guess the form of the optimal contract.
First, intuitively, the optimal contract entails consumption smoothing, i.e., shocks to con-
sumption are permanent. This implies θ21 = θ1. To prove this, the PS constraint (6) yields:
1 = E1
[
c1
c2
]
= e(θ1−θ21)r1E1
[
e−θ2r2−k2
]
. (14)
This must hold for all r1. Therefore, θ21 = θ1 and k2 = lnE1
[
e−θ2r2
]
, as in (11).
Next, consider total utility U :
U = ln c1 + ln c2 − g (a1)− g (a2)
= 2θ1r1 + θ2r2 − g (a1)− g (a2) + 2κ1 + k2.
From (5), the two EF conditions are E2
[
∂U
∂r1
]
≥ g′ (a∗) and E2
[
∂U
∂r2
]
≥ g′ (a∗), i.e.:
2θ1 ≥ g′ (a∗) , θ2 ≥ g′ (a∗) .
Intuitively, the EF constraints should bind (proven in the Appendix), else the CEO is exposed
to unnecessary risk. Combining the binding version of these constraints with (13) yields (12).
Step 2: Optimality of log-linear contracts
We next verify that optimal contracts should be log-linear. Equation (5) yields: d (ln c2) /dr2 ≥
g′ (a∗). The cheapest contract involves this local EF condition binding, i.e.,
d (ln c2) /dr2 = g
′ (a∗) ≡ θ2. (15)
Integrating yields the contract:
ln c2 = θ2r2 +B (r1) , (16)
where B (r1) is a function of r1 which we will determine shortly. It is the integration “constant”
of equation (15) viewed from time 2.
We next apply the PS constraint (6) for t = 1:
1 = E1
[
c1
c2
]
= E1
[ c1
eθ2r2+B(r1)
]
= E1
[
e−θ2r2
]
c1e
−B(r1). (17)
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Hence, we obtain
ln c1 = B (r1) +K, (18)
where the constant K is independent of r1. (In this proof, K, K ′ and K ′′ are constants
independent of r1 and r2.) Total utility is:
U = ln c1 + ln c2 +K
′ = θ2r2 + 2B(r1) + 2K +K
′. (19)
We next apply (5) to (19) to yield: 2B′ (r1) ≥ g′ (a∗) . Again, the cheapest contract involves
this condition binding, i.e., 2B′ (r1) = g′ (a∗) . Integrating yields:
B (r1) = g
′ (a∗)
r1
2
+K ′′. (20)
Combining (20) with (18) yields: ln c1 = g′ (a∗) r12 + κ1, for another constant κ1. Combining
(20) with (16) yields:
ln c2 = g
′ (a∗)
(r1
2
+ r2
)
+ κ1 + k2,
for some constant k2. 
The contract’s closed-form solutions allow transparent economic implications. (8) shows
that time-t income should be linked to the return not only in period t, but also in all previous
periods. Therefore, changes to rt (due to effort or shocks) boost log pay in the current and
all future periods equally. Since the CEO is risk-averse, it is effi cient to spread the effect of
effort and noise over the future. Indeed, Boschen and Smith (1995) find empirically that firm
performance has a much greater effect on the NPV of future pay than current pay.
We now consider how the contract sensitivity changes over time. We consider the case of
a fixed target action (a∗t = a
∗ ∀ t) so that the changes in the contract’s sensitivity are not
driven by changes in the implemented effort level. (9) shows that, in an infinite horizon model
(T = τ →∞), the sensitivity is constant and given by:
θt = θ = (1− ρ) g′ (a∗) . (21)
This is intuitive: the contract must be suffi ciently sharp to compensate for the disutility of
effort, which is constant. Thus, not only does rt have the same effect on log consumption in
every period, but also ln ct is affected by the return in every period to the same degree. The
sensitivity to the current-period return is decreasing in the discount rate —if the CEO is more
impatient (lower ρ), it is necessary to reward him today rather than in the future.
However, for any model with finite life T , (9) shows that θt is increasing over time. To
understand the intuition for this increasing sensitivity, we distinguish between the increase in
lifetime utility for exerting effort (∂U/∂at) and the increase in current utility (∂ut/∂at = θt);
the latter also equals the increase in current log consumption (∂ ln ct/∂at). Since the disutility
of effort is constant, the lifetime utility reward for effort, ∂U/∂at, must also be constant. When
there are fewer remaining periods over which to smooth out this lifetime increase, the increase in
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current utility (∂ut/∂at) must be higher. By contrast, Gibbons and Murphy (1992) generate an
increasing current sensitivity because the lifetime increase in utility ∂U/∂at rises over time, to
offset falling career concerns. In Garrett and Pavan (2009), the current sensitivity rises over time
because ∂U/∂at increases to minimize the agent’s informational rents. Here, ∂U/∂at is constant
since we have no adverse selection or career concerns; instead the increase in ∂ut/∂at stems
from the reduction in consumption smoothing possibilities as the CEO approaches retirement.
Both Gibbons and Murphy (1992) and Cremers and Palia (2011) document that incentives
increase with CEO tenure.
As in the infinite-horizon case, the sensitivity to the current return decreases with discount
rate ρ. In the finite-horizon case, ρ also determines the speed at which incentives rise over time.
If the CEO is more patient, the contract involves greater consumption smoothing to begin
with, and so is more greatly affected by the decline in consumption smoothing possibilities as
retirement approaches. Thus, incentives increase particularly rapidly for more patient CEOs.
While θt depends on the model horizon, it is independent of whether private saving is
possible —this only affects kt. Since private saving does not affect the agent’s action and thus
firm returns, the sensitivity of pay to returns is unchanged. Instead, it alters the time trend in
the level of pay. The log expected growth rate in pay is, from (8): lnE [ct/ct−1] = kt+lnE
[
eθtrt
]
.
If private saving is impossible, substituting for kt using (10) yields:
lnE [ct/ct−1] = R + ln ρ,
which is constant over time and independent of risk. The risk-free rate R is determined by
the time preference of the aggregate economy. If and only if the CEO is more patient than
the representative agent, then the growth rate is positive, as is intuitive. If private saving is
possible, (11) yields:
lnE [ct/ct−1] = R + ln ρ+ lnE[e
−θtrt ] + lnE[eθtrt ].
In the limit of small time intervals (or, equivalently, in the limit of small variance of noises σ2),
this yields:
lnE [ct/ct−1] = R + ln ρ+ θ
2
t σ
2
t .
Thus, the growth rate of consumption is always greater where private saving is possible. This
faster upward trend means that the contract effectively saves for the agent, removing the need
for him to do so himself. This result is consistent with He (2011), who finds that the optimal
contract under private savings involves a wage pattern that is non-decreasing over time.13 The
model thus predicts a positive relationship between the wage and tenure, which is consistent
with the common practice of seniority-based pay. Cremers and Palia (2011) confirm this re-
13Lazear (1979) has a back-loaded wage pattern for incentive, rather than private saving considerations (the
agent is risk-neutral in his model). Since the agent wishes to ensure he receives the high future payments, he
induces effort to avoid being fired. Similarly, in Yang (2009), a back-loaded wage pattern induces agents to
work to avoid the firm being shut down.
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lationship empirically. Moreover, the growth rate depends on the risk to which the CEO is
exposed, which is in turn driven by his sensitivity to the firm’s returns θ, and the volatility
of firm returns σ. CEOs with stronger incentives (e.g., because the agency problem is more
severe) or who work in riskier firms will have pay growing more rapidly over time. This is
intuitive: a rising level of pay insures the CEO from risk, removing the need for him to do so
himself. Furthermore, in a finite-horizon model, θt is increasing over time and so the growth
rate of consumption rises with tenure, i.e., pay accelerates over time.
We can also calculate how much the expected cost of compensation rises if private saving is
possible and the principal must impose the PS constraint —i.e., the cost to the principal of her
inability to monitor the CEO’s private savings. We follow the analysis of Farhi and Werning
(2009) for this calculation.
Corollary 1 (Cost of Private Savings). Define Λ = (Expected cost of contract imposing PS)
/ (Expected cost of contract without imposing PS), and consider L = T = ∞ and a∗t = a∗ ∀t.
We have Λ ≥ 1 and:
Λ =
1− ρ
1− ρeΘ2σ2 e
− ρΘ
2σ2
1−ρ ,
using the notation Θ2σ2 = lnE
[
e−θη
]
+ lnE
[
e+θη
]
. In the limit of small time intervals, Θ ∼
θ = (1− ρ) g′ (a∗) and Λ ∼ e−
θ2σ2
1−ρ / (1− θ2σ2/ (1− ρ)).
The ratio Λ increases in the risk borne by the agent, θ2σ2 as this affects his desire to save.
In addition, from (21) we see that Λ is closer to one when the agent is more patient.
The contract in Theorem 1 also has implications for the appropriate measure of incentives.
Taking first differences of this contract yields:
ln ct − ln ct−1 = θtrt + kt. (22)
The percentage change in CEO pay is linear in the firm’s return rt, i.e., the percentage change
in firm value. Thus, the relevant measure of incentives is the percentage change in pay for a
percentage change in firm value (“percent-percent”incentives), or equivalently the elasticity of
CEO pay to firm value; in real variables, this equals the fraction of total pay that is comprised of
stock. This elasticity/fraction must be θt to achieve incentive compatibility and is independent
of firm size. “Percent-percent”incentives are relevant because effort has a multiplicative (i.e.,
percentage) effect on both CEO utility and firm value.
Empiricists have used alternative statistics to measure incentives — Jensen and Murphy
(1990) calculate “dollar-dollar”incentives (the dollar change in CEO pay for a dollar change in
firm value) and Hall and Liebman (1998) measure “dollar-percent”incentives (the dollar change
in CEO pay for a percentage firm return.) By contrast, Murphy (1999) advocates elasticities
(“percent-percent” incentives) on empirical grounds: they are invariant to firm size and thus
comparable across firms of different size (as found by Gibbons and Murphy (1992)), and firm
returns have greater explanatory power for percentage than dollar changes in pay. Thus, firms
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behave as if they target percent-percent incentives. However, he notes that “elasticities have
no corresponding agency-theoretic interpretation.”Our framework provides a theoretical justi-
fication for using elasticities to measure incentives. Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier (2009) show
that multiplicative preferences and production functions generate elasticities as the incentive
measure, which motivates their use here (equations (1) and (3)).14 Their result was derived in a
one-period model with a risk-neutral CEO; we extend it to a dynamic model with risk aversion
and private saving.
The contract in Theorem 1 involves binding local constraints and implements at = ā. The
remaining steps are to show that the agent will not undertake global deviations (e.g., make large
single-action changes, or simultaneously shirk and save) and that the principal cannot improve
by implementing a different effort level or allowing slack constraints. Since these proofs are
equally clear for general γ as for log utility, we delay them until Section III.
B.1. A Numerical Example
This section uses a simple numerical example to show most clearly the economic forces
behind the contract. We first set T = 3, L = 3, ρ = 1, a∗t = a
∗ and g′ (a∗) = 1. From (9), the
contract is:
ln c1 =
r1
3
+ κ1
ln c2 =
r1
3
+
r2
2
+ κ2
ln c3 =
r1
3
+
r2
2
+
r3
1
+ κ3
where κt =
∑t
s=1 ks. An increase in r1 leads to a permanent increase in log consumption —it
rises by r1
3
in all future periods. In addition, the sensitivity ∂ut/∂at increases over time, from
1/3 to 1/2 to 1/1. The total lifetime reward for effort ∂Ut/∂at is a constant 1 in all periods.
We now consider T = 5, so that the CEO lives after retirement. The contract is now:
ln c1 =
r1
5
+ κ1 (23)
ln c2 =
r1
5
+
r2
4
+ κ2
ln c3 =
r1
5
+
r2
4
+
r3
3
+ κ3
ln c4 =
r1
5
+
r2
4
+
r3
3
+ κ4
ln c5 =
r1
5
+
r2
4
+
r3
3
+ κ5.
Since the CEO takes no action from t = 4, his pay does not depend on r4 or r5. However, it
depends on r1, r2 and r3 as his earlier efforts affect his wealth, from which he consumes.
14Peng and Roell (2009) also use a multiplicative specification and restrict analysis to contracts where log
pay is linear in firm returns. This paper endogenizes the contract form and thus provides a microfoundation for
considering only loglinear contracts.
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C. Implementation: the Dynamic Incentive Account
The contract derived in Section B can be implemented in at least two ways. First, it can be
implemented using purely flow-based pay: the principal simply pays the agent the amount ct
given by Theorem 1. Second, it can be implemented using a wealth-based account, as described
in Proposition 1 below.
Proposition 1 (Contract Implementation via a Dynamic Incentive Account). In a finite-
horizon model, the contract in Theorem 1 can be implemented as follows. The present value of
the CEO’s expected pay is escrowed into a “Dynamic Incentive Account”(“DIA”) at the start
of t = 1.15 A proportion θ1 is invested in the firm’s stock and the remainder in interest-bearing
cash. At the start of each subsequent period t, the DIA is rebalanced so that the proportion
invested in the firm’s stock is θt. A deterministic fraction αt vests at the end of each period and
can be withdrawn for consumption. The vesting fraction is given by:
αt = ct/At = 1/Et
[
T∑
s=t
e−R(s−t)e
∑s
n=t+1 θnηn+kn
]
(i) If private saving is impossible and a∗t = a
∗ ∀ t, αt has a particularly simple form and is
given by αt = (1− ρ) /
(
1− ρT−t
)
.
(ii) In an infinite-horizon model in which private saving is possible, a∗t = a
∗ ∀ t, and noise ηt
is i.i.d., the contract can be implemented by a DIA with αt = α = 1−ρE
[
eθη
]
E
[
e−θη
]
< 1−ρ,
as long as α > 0.
The rebalancing of the DIA ensures that θt of the agent’s wealth is invested in stock at all
time, so that his percent-percent incentives equal θt. This rebalancing addresses a common
problem of options: if firm value declines, their delta and thus incentive effect is reduced. Un-
rebalanced shares suffer a similar problem, even though their delta is 1 regardless of firm value.
The relevant measure of incentives is not the delta of the CEO’s portfolio (which represents
dollar-dollar incentives) but the CEO’s equity as a fraction of his wealth (percent-percent in-
centives). When the stock price falls, this fraction, and thus the CEO’s incentives, are reduced
—intuitively, when the firm becomes smaller, effort has a smaller dollar impact (given a mul-
tiplicative production function) and so a greater dollar value of stock is necessary to preserve
effort incentives.
The DIA addresses this problem by exchanging stock for cash, to maintain the fraction at
θt. Importantly, the additional stock is accompanied by a reduction in cash —it is not given for
free. This addresses a major concern with repricing options after negative returns to restore
15If the CEO has any initial wealth, it is also placed in the DIA. In reality, managers of start-ups often
co-invest in their firm. Note that the stock pays the firm’s actual return. As noted in footnote 6, rt is not the
firm’s actual return, but the actual return plus a constant. This does not affect the implementability with stock
because it only changes the constant kt, which rises by θt(a∗ −R+ lnE [eηt ]).
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incentives —the CEO is rewarded for failure.16 On the other hand, if the share price rises, the
stock fraction grows. Therefore, some shares can be sold for cash, reducing the CEO’s risk,
without incentives falling below θt. Indeed, Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2009) find that decreases
in CEO ownership typically follow good performance.17 Core and Larcker (2002) study stock
ownership guidelines, whereby boards set minimum requirements for executive shareholdings.
In 93% of cases, the requirements relate to the value of shares as a multiple of salary: consistent
with our model, this involves rebalancing (giving additional stock after the price has fallen to
maintain a constant multiple) and implies targeting of percent-percent incentives. The idea of
rebalancing incentive portfolios is similar to the widespread practice of rebalancing investment
portfolios: both are ways of maintaining desired weights in response to stock price changes.
The DIA thus features dynamic rebalancing to ensure that the EF constraint is satisfied in
the current period. This rebalancing is state-dependent: if the stock price rises (falls), stock is
sold (bought) for cash. The second key feature of the DIA is gradual vesting. This vesting is
time-dependent: regardless of the account’s value, the CEO can only withdraw a percentage αt
in each period for consumption. The fraction αt is history-independent. This gradual vesting
has two roles. First, it achieves consumption smoothing. Second, it ensures that the EF
constraint is satisfied in future periods, by guaranteeing that the CEO has suffi cient wealth in
the account for the principal to “play with”so that she can achieve the required equity stake by
rebalancing this wealth. If the CEO is allowed to fully withdraw his wealth from the account,
his wealth would be outside the principal’s control and so she would not be able to rebalance it.
This motivation exists during the CEO’s employment only —the account fully vests in period
L. The CEO is not exposed to returns after period L as he cannot affect them and so any
exposure would merely subject him to unnecessary risk. Note that this motivation for gradual
vesting contrasts existing verbal arguments based on deterring myopic actions (e.g., Bebchuk
and Fried (2004), Holmstrom (2005), Bhagat and Romano (2009)). While we show in Section
IV that allowing for such actions provides an additional case for gradual vesting, the core model
demonstrates that gradual vesting is optimal even if short-termism is not possible.
Moreover, in contrast to the above verbal arguments on the vesting horizon, Proposition
1 explicitly solves for the optimal vesting rate in a number of benchmark cases. This al-
lows us to analyze the economic forces that affect the vesting rate. If private saving is fea-
sible and the model horizon is infinite, part (i) specializes to α = 1 − ρ. Thus, the vest-
ing fraction is time-independent, just like the contract sensitivity θt. If the horizon is finite,
αt = (1− ρ) /
(
1− ρT−t
)
and is increasing over time. This is intuitive: since the CEO has
fewer periods over which to enjoy his wealth, he should consume a greater percentage in later
periods. Part (ii) shows that, in an infinite horizon model where private saving is possible, we
16Achraya, John, and Sundaram (2000) show that the cost of rewarding failure may be outweighed by the
benefit of reincentivization, and so repricing options can be optimal. The rebalancing in the DIA achieves the
benefit of reincentivization without the cost of rewarding failure.
17Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2009) measure CEO ownership by the percentage of shares outstanding (dollar-
dollar incentives), rather than percent-percent incentives θt. Thus, ownership must fall (rise) with good (bad)
performance to keep θt constant.
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have α < 1− ρ. The agent would like not to hold stock as it carries a zero risk premium, but is
forced to invest θ%. He thus wishes to save to insure himself against this risk. To remove these
incentives, we have α < 1 − ρ so that the account grows faster than it vests, thus providing
automatic saving. In both (i) and (ii), the vesting fraction increases when the CEO is more
impatient (i.e., ρ is lower), as is intuitive.
One aspect of a wealth-based implementation that we do not model explicitly is the funding
of the DIA by the firm. In the simplest case of Proposition 1, the present value of the CEO’s
future salary is placed in the account when he is initially appointed. Alternatively, the firm
may smooth out these contributions over time by funding the account gradually. In addition,
the DIA (regardless of how it is funded) represents only one implementation of the contract.
Other implementations are possible: rather than setting up an account and rebalancing, the
principal can simply pay the agent ct in each period, i.e., implement the contract with purely
flow compensation. The DIA implementation highlights the economic interpretation of such a
payment scheme: it has the same effect as if the NPV of the CEO’s future pay was escrowed,
rebalanced and gradually vested. The interest in showing that the contract can be implemented
via a wealth-based account is that this allows consumption to be history-dependent, without
new flows of pay having to depend on past returns in a complex manner, as discussed in the
Introduction.
III. Generalization and Justification
This section is divided as follows. Section A generalizes our contract to all CRRA utility
functions and autocorrelated noise, and shows that the local EF constraint must bind. Section B
derives suffi cient conditions for the contract to be fully incentive compatible (i.e., deters global
deviations) and Section C proves that, if the firm is suffi ciently large, the optimal contract
indeed involves a deterministic effort level —it requires at = ā after every history. Section D
discusses the role played by each of the assumptions in generating the model’s key results.
A. General CRRA Utility and Autocorrelated Signals
The core model assumes that the signal rt was the firm’s stock return and so it is reasonable
to assume the noises ηt are uncorrelated. However, in private firms, there is no stock return;
for some public firms, the stock is illiquid and thus an inaccurate measure of performance.
Therefore, alternative signals of effort must be used such as profits. Unlike stock returns, shocks
to profits may be serially correlated. This subsection extends the model to such a case. We
assume that ηt follows an AR(1) process with autoregressive parameter φ, i.e., ηt = φηt−1 + εt,
φ ∈ [0, 1], where εt are independent and bounded above and below by εt and εt.
We also now allow for a general CRRA utility function. Note that for γ 6= 1, the IEE is not
valid if private savings are impossible, so we only consider the case where the PS constraint is
imposed. We define Jt = ρte−(1−γ)g(a
∗
t ) for t ≤ L and Jt = ρt otherwise. The optimal contract
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is given in Theorem 2 below. Even though the principal must rule out private savings, she still
has freedom in the choice of the contract (and so the optimization problem remains complex) if
she wishes to implement a boundary action (Theorem 4 gives suffi cient conditions under which
a boundary action is optimal.) With a boundary action, the principal could use a contract with
a greater sensitivity than necessary. Theorem 2 proves that this is suboptimal.
Theorem 2 (General CRRA utility, autocorrelated noise, with the PS constraint.) The cheap-
est contract that satisfies the local constraints and implements at = a∗t ∀ t is as follows. In each
period t, the CEO is paid ct which satisfies:
ln ct = ln c0 +
t∑
s=1
θs (rs − φrs−1) +
t∑
s=1
ks, (24)
where θs and ks are constants and r0 = 0. The sensitivity θs is given by:
θs =

Js(g′(a∗s)−φθs+1)∑T
m=s Jm
∏m
n=s+1 Es
[
e
(1−γ)[θn(εn+a∗n−φa∗n−1)+kn]
] + φθs+1 for s ≤ L,
0 for s > L.
(25)
The constant ks is given by:
γks = R + ln ρ− (1− γ)g(a∗s)1s=L+1 + lnE
[
e−γθs(εs+a
∗
s−φa∗s−1)
]
for s ≤ T. (26)
The initial condition c0 is chosen to give the agent his reservation utility u.
If L = T = ∞ and a∗t = a∗ ∀ t, the sensitivity (25) simplifies to a constant θs = θ, where
θ is given by (A.11) in Appendix A. In the limit of small time intervals, and when φ = 0, we
have:
θ =
1−
√
1− 2(γ − 1)σ2g′(a∗)2 (γ−1)R−ln ρ
γ
(γ − 1)σ2g′(a∗) . (27)
and ks = k = (R + ln ρ) /γ − θa∗ − γθ2σ2/2.
Equation (24) shows that moving from log to general CRRA utility but retaining indepen-
dent noise has little effect on the functional form of the optimal contract, which remains in
closed-form and independent of the noise distribution. Similarly, γ only affects the specific
values of θ and k rather than the functional form. The time trend of the contract sensitivity
and the implementation via the DIA remain the same. The difference is that the parameters
θ and k are somewhat more complex. To understand the economic forces that determine θ,
consider the benchmark case where φ = 0, L = T, and a∗t = a
∗, ∀t. Then, the sensitivity (25)
becomes
θt =
Jtc
1−γ
t∑T
s=tE
[
Jsc
1−γ
s
]g′ (a∗) , (28)
which stems directly from the EF condition. Under plausible parameterizations of the model
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(e.g., small time intervals, or ln ρ + R is close to 0), when γ ≥ 1, the sensitivity increases
over time up to θT = g′ (a∗) and is steeper if the agent is more risk averse (higher γ) and less
patient (lower ρ), and stock return volatility is higher. (The full derivations are in Appendix
C.) Intuitively, these changes decrease the utility the agent derives from future consumptions,∑T
s=tE [Jsc
1−γ
s ], which is in the denominator of (28). Since future rewards are insuffi cient to
induce effort, the CEO must be given a higher sensitivity to current consumption.
Equation (24) shows that, with autocorrelated signals, the optimal contract links the per-
centage change in CEO pay in period t to innovations in the signal (rt − φrt−1) between t and
t− 1, rather than the absolute signal in period t. This is intuitive: since good luck (i.e., a posi-
tive shock) in the last period carries over to the current period, the contract should control for
the last period’s signal to avoid paying the CEO for luck. Similarly, if there is an industry-wide
component to rt, the optimal contract will filter out this component, just as it filters out φrt−1.
Thus, relative performance evaluation can be combined with the contract.
B. Global Constraints
We have thus far derived the best contract that satisfies the local constraints. We now verify
that this contract also satisfies the global constraints, i.e., the agent will not undertake global
deviations. The following analysis derives a suffi cient condition on g to guarantee this.
The contract in Theorem 2 pays the agent an income yt, given by:
ln yt = ln c0 +
t∑
s=1
θs(as + ηs − φ(as−1 + ηs−1)) +
t∑
s=1
ks, (29)
The following Theorem states that if the cost function g is suffi ciently convex and the target
effort level does not rise too rapidly over time, the CEO has no profitable global deviation.
Theorem 3 (No global deviations are profitable.) Consider the maximization problem:
max
at,ct adapted
E
[
T∑
t=1
ρtu
(
cte
−g(at)
)]
(30)
with
∑T
t=1 e
−rt (yt − ct) ≥ 0 and yt satisfying (29). If function g is suffi ciently convex (i.e.,
infa g
′′ (a) is suffi ciently large) and θt − φθt+1 ≥ 0 ∀ t, the solution of this problem is ct ≡ yt,
t ≤ T, and at = a∗t , ∀t. There is no global deviation from the recommended policy that makes
the agent better off.
The role of the condition on the convexity of the cost function is standard. The intuition for
the condition that θt − φθt+1 ≥ 0 ∀ t is that, if the target effort level (and thus contract slope
θt) rises rapidly over time, the agent will shirk in period t. This will reduce the period t return
rt and thus his consumption ct, but increase his wage in all future periods —if noise is highly
autocorrelated (φ is high), then the combination of a low rt and high returns in future periods
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will fool the principal into thinking that the agent exerted higher effort in periods t+1 onwards
than he actually did. Formally, the problem becomes non-concave. Thus, we require either
low autocorrelation in the noise (low φ) or the target action not to rise too rapidly over time.
Indeed, in Theorem 4 we show that, if firm size X is suffi ciently large, the optimal contract
involves a constant effort level.
The proof, in the Appendix, may be of general methodological interest. It involves three
steps. First, we reparameterize the agent’s utility from a function of consumption and effort
to one of consumption and leisure, where the new variable, leisure, is defined so that utility is
jointly concave in both arguments. Second, we construct an “upper-linearization”function: we
create a surrogate agent with a linear state-dependent utility. Third, we prove that any global
deviation by the surrogate agent weakly reduces his utility. It is automatic that there is no
motive to save under linear utility. Turning to effort, if the cost of effort g is suffi ciently convex,18
the PV of the agent’s income is concave in leisure. Since utility is linear in consumption, and
consumption equals income, utility is concave in leisure and so there is no profitable deviation.
Since our original agent’s utility function is concave, his utility is the same as the surrogate
agent’s under the recommended policy, and weakly lower under any other policy. Thus, any
deviation also reduces the original agent’s utility. The third step is a Lemma that shows that
the PV of income is a concave function of actions under suitable reparameterization. It thus
may have broader applicability to other agency theories, allowing the use of the first-order
approach to significantly simplify the problem.
C. The Optimality of High Effort
This section derives conditions under which the principal wishes to implement the boundary
effort level at = ā in every period and after every history. We refer to a as “high effort”, to use
similar terminology to models with discrete effort levels (e.g., high, medium, low) in which the
high effort level is typically optimal.
Theorem 4 (High effort is optimal if the firm is suffi ciently large.) Assume that infη∈(η,η) f (η) >
0 and supa∈(a,a) g
′′ (a) /g′2 (a) <∞, where f is the probability density of η. There exists X∗ such
that if baseline firm size X > X∗, implementing at = ā is optimal.
The intuition is as follows. For any alternative contract satisfying the incentive constraints,
we compare the benefits and costs of moving to a high effort contract. The benefits are multi-
plicative in firm size. The costs comprise the direct disutility from working, the risk premium
required to compensate the CEO for a variable contract, and the change in CEO’s informa-
tional rent (which are all a function of the CEO’s wage). Since the CEO’s wage is substantially
smaller than firm size, the benefits of high effort outweigh the costs. In practice, a boundary
18See Dittmann and Yu (2010) for a similar convexity condition to ensure that the local optimum is globally
optimal. They consider a one-period model where private savings are not possible, but the CEO chooses risk
as well as effort.
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effort level arises because there is a limit to the number of productive activities the CEO can
undertake to benefit the principal. Under the literal interpretation of a as effort, there is a
finite number of positive-NPV projects available and a limit to the number of hours a day the
CEO can work while remaining productive. Under the interpretation of a as rent extraction, a
reflects zero stealing.
The complexity in the proof lies in deriving an upper bound on the informational rent
(which stems from the CEO’s private information about the noise η) and the risk imposed
on the CEO from incentives (which depends on the CEO’s ability to self-insure via privately
saving). Any change in the implemented effort level requires adjusting the wage not only in a
particular period for the whole range of noises, but also across time periods to deter private
saving. Implementing at = ā in period t requires the time-t contract to change. Moreover,
the change in the time-t contract has a knock-on effect on the time t− 1 contract, which must
change to deter saving between time t − 1 and time t. The change in the time t − 1 contract
impacts the time t − 2 contract, and so on: due to private saving, the contract adjustments
“resonate”across all time periods. It is this non-separability which significantly complicates the
problem. These complications are absent in EG, who derive a similar result in a single-period
model.
This above result may be of use for future theories by simplifying the contracting problem.
Grossman and Hart (1983) solved the one-period contracting problem in two stages: finding
the cheapest contract that implements a given effort level, and then finding the optimal effort
level. Solving both stages is typically highly complex; indeed, Grossman and Hart can only do
so numerically. The idea that the benefits of effort are orders of magnitude higher than the
costs simplifies the problem —since high effort is optimal, the second stage of the contracting
problem is solved and so the analysis can focus exclusively on the first stage.
D. Discussion of Modeling Assumptions
This subsection discusses which of the model’s assumptions are necessary for its key results.
We view the paper’s main contributions as threefold:
E. (Economic): Economic insights on the forces that drive the optimal contract, e.g., how
the sensitivity θt and level kt of pay change over time and depend on the environment; how
the CEO remains exposed to firm returns after retirement if short-termism is possible.
T. (Tractability): Achieving a simple, closed-form optimal contract in a dynamic setting
with private saving and short-termism.
I. (Implementation): The contract can be implemented with a wealth-based account, with
state-dependent rebalancing and time-dependent vesting (I1). The account contains the
standard instruments of stock and cash (I2)
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Note that (E) and (I) are distinct implications. The contract in Theorem 1 can always
be implemented with flow pay, i.e., paying the CEO an amount ct in every period, and all the
economic implications of the contract would follow. (I) refers to only one simple implementation.
We now discuss the roles played by the main assumptions in generating the above results:
A1. CRRA utility and multiplicative preferences. We consider these assumptions together as
they are closely intertwined — the former (latter) means that an agent’s allocation to
risky assets (leisure) is proportional to his wage. EG show that these assumptions are
not necessary for a simple contract if there is only terminal consumption. However, they
are important in a model with intermediate consumption as they lead to multiplicative
separability and key variables scaling with the wage. To understand the importance of
multiplicative preferences for (T), assume L = T and consider the final period L. With
multiplicative preferences, the incentive measure is the elasticity of pay to firm value. This
elasticity must be θL, irrespective of the level of pay in period L —and is thus independent
of the history of past returns. The principal can thus defer the rewards for performance
in prior periods (to smooth consumption) without distorting effort incentives. Deferral
affects the level of pay in period L but not effort incentives, as long as the elasticity
remains θL.
Multiplicative preferences also mean that the whole promised wealth of the agent in
period 1 is multiplicative in c1(r1), promised wealth at period 2 conditional on r1 is
multiplicative in c2(r1, r2)19, and so on. In other words, a shock to r1 has a multiplicative
effect on consumption in all future periods. Moreover, when we also have CRRA utility,
this multiplicative effect is the same in every future period, for optimal risk-sharing. If r1
falls by 2%, log consumption falls by C × 2% in the current and all future periods, where
C is a constant. Thus, rewards for performance are smoothed in a simple manner, and
this smoothing is also independent of the history of past returns —for example, the effect
of r2 on c2, ..., cT is independent of r1.20 Together, both assumptions mean that, although
consumption is history-dependent, θt is history-independent and so the dynamic contract
is a simple extension of the static contract.
The assumptions also allow a wealth-based implementation, i.e., (I1). Since wealth is a
multiple of consumption, consumption is a fraction of wealth. We can therefore implement
the contract by investing the CEO’s wealth into instruments that yield c1(r1) in the
first period, allowing him to consume a fraction α1, then rebalancing by investing the
remainder of his wealth in instruments that yield c2(r1, r2) as a function of r2, and so
on. The thresholds to which the account must be rebalanced θt are history-independent,
19We require c2 (r1, r2) = c1 (r1) f (r2), c3(r1, r2, r3) = c2 (r1, r2) g (r2) etc., i.e. multiplicative separability.
20With multiplicative preferences but without CRRA, the smothing is complex and history-dependent. Con-
sider a 2-period model with u(c, a) = ech(a). We have c2(r1, r2) = B(r1)eθ2r2 , and PS yields ec1h(a) =
E1
[
eB(r1)e
θ2r2h(a)
]
. Even though r1 has a multiplicative effect on c2, solving for the magnitude of this ef-
fect B(r1) is highly complex.
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since the elasticity is history-independent. Furthermore, since the return in a particular
period has the same effect on all future consumptions, the ratio of current consumption
to the sum of all future consumptions (i.e., wealth) is a constant and is independent of
past shocks. Thus, the CEO’s promised wealth is a suffi cient statistic for his current
consumption —the sequence of past returns that led to the CEO accumulating this level
of wealth is irrelevant. Since consumption depends on current wealth alone, the vesting
fraction αt is history-independent.21
Multiplicative separability is not necessary for (T) —additive separability with CARA
utility and additive preferences would also work (see Appendix E); the above arguments
apply but with dollar amounts replacing percentage amounts. However, the model would
predict that dollar-percent incentives are the relevant measure and independent of pay
and firm size (contrary to evidence, e.g., Jensen and Murphy (1990)). Moreover, it would
not permit a wealth-based implementation, i.e., (I1). With multiplicative preferences, the
relevant measure of incentives is percent-percent incentives, which equals the fraction of
wealth that is in stock. Regardless of the level of wealth, it can always be rebalanced to
ensure that the fraction is at the required level. By contrast, dollar-percent incentives
equal the dollar value of equity. If the value of the account falls below the required
dollar equity holding, there is no way that it can be rebalanced to restore the CEO’s
equity holdings to this threshold, since cash cannot be negative owing to limited liability.
Put differently, if a fall in returns reduces future consumption by a fixed dollar amount,
after suffi ciently many periods of low returns, the required future consumption would be
negative.
Multiplicative preferences are not necessary for (E). In any model with myopia, the CEO
must remain tied to firm returns after he retires. The time trend in θ is determined by
consumption smoothing motives and the time trend in k is determined by the need to
save for the agent; neither hinge on the specific preference formulation.
A2. Multiplicative production function. This assumption is used in the proof of the optimality
of at = a in Theorem 4. It is a suffi cient, rather than necessary condition for this result —as
long as the dollar benefits of effort are increasing in (although not necessarily proportional
to) firm size, at = a will be optimal if the firm is suffi ciently large. Moreover, as discussed
at the end of Section C, Theorem 4 is not needed if we wish to focus on the cheapest
contract to implement a given target action. The multiplicative production function is
only necessary to implement the contract using stocks, i.e., (I2). With a multiplicative
production function, the CEO’s action affects the firm’s return, and stocks are sensitive
to the firm’s return.
21One could argue that it is always possible to implement a contract with rebalancing and vesting, where the
vesting fraction αt and rebalancing target θt are complex functions of the past history, and so (I1) does not hinge
on our assumptions (A1). However, such an implementation would be complex; the key role of assumptions
(A1) is to allow θt and αt to be history-independent.
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A3. Noise-before-action timing. This timing assumption was convenient for the derivation of
the contract by forcing the EF constraints to hold state-by-state. With reversed “action-
before-noise” timing, the contract becomes complex even in a static model (see, e.g.,
Grossman and Hart (1983)). In particular, the solution typically does not feature a
constant elasticity of pay to firm value. However, the paper’s other insights, aside from
(I2), remain valid. We sketch the general argument using a simple example.
Consider a one-period problem, in which principal minimizes the cost of providing incen-
tives to exert effort a, with log utility and “action-before-noise”timing. First, it can be
shown that, with log utility, if c(r) solves the problem when the agent’s expected utility is
U , then for any z > 0, z× c(r) solves the problem with expected utility U + ln z. In other
words, to deliver a higher expected utility, the principal must scale up all payments by
the same fixed constant, regardless of the realized returns. The timing assumption only
matters for the actual form of c (r) (with “noise-before-action”timing, c(r) has a partic-
ularly simple form: it is a multiple of eCr for some constant C; with “action-before-noise”
timing, c (r) a multiple of eb(r) for some general function b) —but the above “scaling”
result holds regardless of the timing.
Moving to T = L = 2, the above claim means that the return at t = 2 affects pay at t = 2
multiplicatively. Therefore, the contract must have the form:
c2(r1, r2) = e
b1(r1)eb2(r2),
for b2 ≡ b and some function b1. The PS constraint yields:
c1(r1) = e
b1(r1)−k,
for the constant k = lnE[e−b2(r2)], analogous to (11). Thus, c2(r1, r2) and c1(r1) are
affected by r1 in the same manner. Finally, b1 is the solution to a static problem where
the CEO’s utility of consumption is 2 ln c.
In sum, the two-period dynamic problem with private saving can be reduced to two static
problems: solving for functions b1 and b2. Thus, while the static problem is complex,
the dynamic model represents a simple extension: each static problem can be solved
independently without complex history-dependence. Thus, much of (T) is preserved.
Moreover, promised wealth at period 2 conditional on r1 is multiplicative in c2(r1, r2) and
so on, and so (I1) is preserved. At t = 1, the principal must invest the funds into an
instrument that yields eb1(r1). At t = 2, regardless of r1, she must invest the funds into
an instrument that yields eb2(r2). With noise-before-action timing, bn (r) = θn × r so the
instrument was a combination of cash and stock; with reversed timing, bn (r) is not linear
in r and so in general the instrument will not be cash and stock, so we do not have (I2).
Appendix B shows that the contract retains the same form in continuous time, where the
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noise and action are simultaneous.
IV. Short-Termism
We now study how our basic contract changes when the agent can inflate the firm’s returns,
focusing on the log utility case for simplicity. Following on from Theorem 4, we assume that
a∗t = a ∀ t. Short-termism is broadly defined to encompass any action that increases current
returns at the expense of future returns. This includes real decisions such as scrapping positive-
NPV investments (see, e.g., Stein (1988)) or taking negative-NPV projects that generate an
immediate return but have a downside that may not manifest for several years (such as sub-
prime lending), earnings management, and accounting manipulation.
We model short-termism in the following manner. In each period t ≤ L, at the same time as
taking action at, the agent also chooses a vector of myopic actionsmt = {mt,1(rt+1), ...,mt,M(rt+M)}.
A single myopic activity mt,i(rt+i) ∈ [0,m] (for an upper bound m > 0) changes the returns
from rs = as + ηs to
r′t = rt + λi (E[mt,i(rt+i)]) for s = t,
r′t+i = rt+i −mt,i(rt+i) for s = t+ i,
r′s = rs for s 6= t, t+ i.
Short-termism raises returns in period t by λi (E[mt,i(rt+i)]) (the function λi (·) will be specified
shortly) and decreases them in period t + i by mt,i(rt+i). This specification allows the CEO
to engage in myopia state-by-state: the negative effect of short-termism mt,i depends on the
realized return rt+i and thus the state of nature ηt+i. Thus, the CEO can choose the states
in which the costs of myopia are suffered. Giving the agent great freedom to inflate earnings
restricts the set of admissible contracts that the principal can write to deter myopia, and thus
leads to a simple solution to the contracting problem. This is similar to how specifying the
noise before the action leads to tractability in the core model, as discussed in Section I. In
practice, CEOs can engage in short-termism by scrapping certain investments that pay off only
in certain states of the world —for example, investing to increase the safety of a factory pays
off if there is a disaster; expanding the capacity of a factory pays off only if demand turns out
to be high.
We have 1 ≤ i ≤ M , where i is the “release lag” of the myopic activity: the number of
periods before its negative consequences become evident. For example, if the agent manipulates
accounting to delay the realization of expenses for five years, i = 5. M ≤ τ−L is the maximum
possible release lag. The function λi (E[mt,i(rt+i)]) captures the effi ciency of earnings inflation:
a greater λi (·) means that a given future reduction in returns E [mt,i(rt+i)] translates into a
greater boost today. We assume λi (0) = 0, λ′i > 0, λ
′′
i < 0 and
qi ≡ λ′i (0) <
eη−Mm
E [eη]
. (31)
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so that 0 < qi < 1. This assumption is suffi cient to guarantee that all myopic actions are
ineffi cient and create a first-order loss on firm value by reducing the expected terminal dividend,
as proven in Appendix E.
A. Local Constraint
If the agent engages in a small myopic action mt,i(rt+i) at time t, his utility changes to the
leading order by
Et
[
∂U
∂rt
]
qiEt [mt,i (r̃t+i)] + Et
[
−mt,i(r̃t+i)Et
[
∂U
∂rt+i
| r̃t+i
]]
.
We require that, for every mt,i(rt+i) ≥ 0, the change in utility is nonnegative, i.e.,
Et
[
∂U
∂rt
]
qiEt [mt,i (r̃t+i)] + Et
[
−mt,i(r̃t+i)Et
[
∂U
∂rt+i
| r̃t+i
]]
≤ 0, i.e.,
Et
[
∂U
∂rt
]
qi
∫
mt,i (rt+i) f(rt+i)drt+i −
∫
mt,i (rt+i) f(rt+i)Et
[
∂U
∂rt+i
| r̃t+i = rt+i
]
drt+i ≤ 0,
This leads to the following No Myopia (NM) constraint:
NM : ∀rt+i, Et
[
∂U
∂rt
]
qi − Et
[
∂U
∂rt+i
| r̃t+i = rt+i
]
≤ 0. (32)
To interpret the conditioning, consider the case i = 3. The second expectation is conditioned
on (rs)s≤t and rt+3, but not on rt+1 nor rt+2.
B. The Contract
There are now three local constraints: EF, PS and NM. We seek the cheapest contract that
satisfies these three constraints, i.e., induces zero myopia, zero private saving and high effort.
The intuition behind implementing zero myopia is similar to that behind high effort as proven
in Theorem 4: the benefits of preventing short-termism are multiplicative in firm size and thus
orders of magnitude greater than the costs, which are a function of the CEO’s salary. Relatedly,
using a similar argument to Theorem 3, we conjecture that the contract that satisfies the three
local constraints will also satisfy the global constraints if the function λi (·) (which captures
the effi ciency of inflation) is suffi ciently concave, analogous to the suffi cient condition on the
convexity of the cost of effort g (·) in Theorem 3. Given the high complexity of the proofs of
Theorems 3 and 4, we do not provide analogous proofs here.
Proposition 2 below gives the cheapest contract that satisfies the three local constraints.
Proposition 2 (Log utility, myopia possible.) The cheapest contract that satisfies the local
constraints for high effort, zero private saving and zero myopia is as follows. In each period t,
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the CEO is paid ct which satisfies:
ln ct = ln c0 +
t∑
s=1
θsrs +
t∑
s=1
ks,
where θs and ks are constants. The sensitivity θs is given by:
θs =
{
ζs
1+ρ+...+ρT−s for s ≤ L+M
0 for s > L+M
, (33)
with ζ1 = g′(ā). For s > 1, ζs is defined recursively as:
ζs =
 max1≤i≤M
{
g′(ā), qi
ρi
ζs−i
}
for s ≤ L
maxs−L≤i≤M
{
qi
ρi
ζs−i
}
for L < s ≤ L+M
.
If private saving is impossible, the constant ks is given by:
ks = R + ln ρ− lnE[eθs(ā+η)].
If private saving is possible, ks is given by:
ks = R + ln ρ+ lnE[e
−θs(ā+η)].
The initial condition c0 is chosen to give the agent his reservation utility u.
From (33), the possibility of short-termism has three effects on the contract sensitivity,
which must change to prevent such actions. First, in the core model, there are two motivations
for time-dependent vesting: consumption smoothing and the need to maintain suffi cient equity
in the DIA to satisfy the EF constraints in future periods. These motivations exist during the
CEO’s employment only and full vesting occurs in period L. Where myopia is possible, time-
dependent vesting has an additional motivation —to satisfy the NM constraint in the current
period, by preventing the CEO from inflating the current stock price and immediately cashing
out. This motivation exists both during the CEO’s employment and after retirement. Thus,
gradual vesting continues after retirement and the account only fully vests in period L + M ,
since myopia allows the CEO to affect firm returns up to period L+M . While we are unaware
of any large-scale studies, anecdotal evidence is consistent with such lock-ups. The severance
agreement of Stanley O’Neal (ex-CEO of Merrill Lynch) states that: “the unvested restricted
stock and restricted stock units will continue to vest in accordance with their original schedules.”
During employment, equity grants are often restricted in practice: Kole (1997) finds a typical
vesting horizon of 2-3 years. A number of firms are lengthening their horizons in the aftermath
of the financial crisis: many commentators argued that short vesting periods in certain firms
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encouraged myopia in the crisis.22
Second, the contract sensitivity θt is higher in each period, because the contract must now
satisfy NM as well as EF. Third, θt trends upwards more rapidly over time. Short-termism
allows the CEO to increase the time-t return and thus his time-t consumption. Even though
the return at time t+ it will be lower, the effect on the CEO’s utility is discounted. Therefore,
an increasing sensitivity is necessary to deter myopia, so that he loses more dollars in the future
than he gains today to offset the effect of discounting. For example, in an infinite horizon model
where myopia is impossible, (21) shows that the sensitivity is constant. (33) shows that the
sensitivity is increasing over time if short-termism is possible.
The magnitude of the above three changes depends on the CEO’s incentives to inflate
earnings, which are determined by two forces. The benefit to the CEO of short-termism is that
he boosts current returns and thus pay, which outweighs the negative effect on future returns
owing to discounting. The discount rate ρ determines the size of this benefit. The cost is that
myopia is ineffi cient, as the current boost to returns exceeds the future cost. For local myopic
actions, the parameter qi determines the size of the cost. Overall, when qi is higher and ρ
is lower, the CEO’s incentives to inflate earnings are greater; thus, the CEO is given greater
exposure to returns after retirement, and the contract sensitivity is higher in every period and
increases more rapidly over time.
Moreover, all of the above changes to the sensitivity θt also affect the constant term kt.
Thus, if private saving is possible, the increase in θt causes the level of the contract to grow
more rapidly over time, providing automatic saving for the agent. While the possibility of
myopia only has a direct effect on the sensitivity of pay, this spills over into an indirect effect
on the level of pay.
A specific example conveys the economics of the contract more clearly. Let qi = Qi for some
Q ∈ (0, 1), i.e., a myopic action hidden for i periods increases current returns by Qi, a factor
that decreases at a constant rate Q per year of hiding. This natural benchmark allows for the
slopes ζt in (33) to be defined explicitly rather than recursively. These are given as follows.
Corollary 2 Suppose that Q ∈ (0, 1), qi = Qi. If Q < ρ, then ζt = g′ (a) for t ≤ L and
ζt = g
′ (a) (Q/ρ)t−L for L < t ≤ L+M . If Q ≥ ρ, then ζt = g′ (a) (Q/ρ)t−1 for t ≤ L+M .
We consider an infinite horizon model (T = L =∞) for comparison with the sensitivity in
the absence of myopia, θt = (1− ρ) g′ (a) from (21). ζt depends on whether Q ≶ ρ, owing to
the above trade-off arguments. If Q < ρ, myopia is suffi ciently ineffi cient that the benefit is
less than the cost. Thus, the contract in the core model (equation (21)) is already suffi cient to
deter short-termism and need not change. If Q > ρ, the CEO does have incentives to inflate
22For example, Angelo Mozilo, the former CEO of Countrywide, sold over $100m of stock prior to his firm’s
collapse; Bebchuk, Cohen, and Spamann (2010) estimate that top management at Bear Stearns and Lehman
earned $1.4bn and $1bn respectively from cash bonuses and equity sales during 2000-8; a November 20, 2008
Wall Street Journal article entitled “Before the Bust, These CEOs Took Money Off the Table”provides further
examples. Johnson, Ryan, and Tian (2009) find a positive correlation between corporate fraud and unrestricted
(i.e. immediately vesting) stock compensation.
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earnings under the original contract, and so the sensitivity must increase to
θt = (1− ρ) (Q/ρ)t−1 g′ (a) .
The (Q/ρ)t−1 term demonstrates that the sensitivity is not only greater in every period than in
the core model, but is also increasing over time. The more impatient the CEO, the greater the
incentives to inflate earnings, and so the greater the required increase in sensitivity over time
to deter myopia. In a finite horizon model, θt is already increasing if myopia is impossible; the
feasibility of short-termism causes it to rise even faster.
B.1. Numerical Example
We return to the last numerical example from Section B.1 to demonstrate the effect of
myopia on the contract. If M = 1, the contract changes from (23) to:
ln c1 =
r1
5
+ κ1
ln c2 =
r1
5
+
r2
4
+ κ2
ln c3 =
r1
5
+
r2
4
+
r3
3
+ κ3
ln c4 =
r1
5
+
r2
4
+
r3
3
+
q1r4
2
+ κ4
ln c5 =
r1
5
+
r2
4
+
r3
3
+
q1r4
2
+ κ5.
The CEO’s income now depends on r4, otherwise he would have an incentive to boost r3 at
the expense of r4. The sensitivity to r4 depends on the effi ciency of earnings inflation q1; in
the extreme, if q1 = 0, myopia is impossible and so there is no need to expose the CEO to
returns after retirement. The contract is unchanged for t ≤ 3, i.e., for the periods in which
the CEO works. Even under the original contract, there is no incentive to inflate earnings at
t = 1 or t = 2 because there is no discounting, and so the negative effect of myopia on future
returns reduces the CEO’s lifetime utility by more than as the positive effect on current returns
increases it. Appendix D allows for a variable cost of effort and shows that the possibility of
short-termism forces the contract to change in t ≤ L even if there is no discounting.
V. Conclusion
This paper presents a new framework for studying CEO compensation in a fully dynamic
model while retaining tractability. The model allows the CEO to consume in each period,
privately save, and temporarily inflate returns. The model’s closed-form solutions yield clear
implications for the economic drivers of both the level of pay and the sensitivity of pay to per-
formance. Pay depends on stock returns in the current and all past periods, and the sensitivity
to a given return is constant over time. The relevant measure of incentives is the percentage
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change in pay for a percentage change in firm value. This required elasticity is constant over
time in an infinite horizon model where short-termism is impossible, and rising if the horizon is
finite or if short-termism is possible, even in the absence of career concerns. Deterring myopia
also requires the CEO to remain sensitive to firm returns after retirement. By contrast, the
feasibility of private saving only impacts the level of pay. It augments the rise in compensation
over time, removing the need for the CEO to save himself.
The optimal contract can be implemented using a mechanism that we call a “Dynamic
Incentive Account”. The CEO’s expected pay is placed into an account, of which a certain
proportion is invested in the firm’s stock. The account features state-dependent rebalancing to
ensure that, as the stock price changes, the CEO always has suffi cient incentives to exert effort
in the current period. It also features time-dependent vesting during employment, to ensure
that the CEO exerts effort in future periods, and after retirement to deter myopia.
Our key results are robust to a broad range of settings: general CRRA utility functions,
all noise distributions with interval support, and autocorrelated noise. However, our setup
imposes some limitations, in particular that the CEO remains with the firm for a fixed period.
Abstracting from imperfect commitment problems allows us to focus on a single source of market
imperfection —moral hazard —and is common in the dynamic moral hazard literature (e.g.,
Lambert (1983), Rogerson (1985), Biais et al. (2007, 2009)). An interesting extension would
be to allow for quits and firings. As is well-known (e.g., Bolton and Dewatripont (2005)), the
possibility of quitting significantly complicates intertemporal risk-sharing since the agent may
leave if his continuation wealth is low; firings may provide an additional source of incentives (as
analyzed by DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) and DeMarzo and Fishman (2007) in a risk-neutral
model).23 We leave those extensions to future research.
23The implementation of the contract via the DIA will involve the CEO forfeiting a portion of the account if
he leaves early. Indeed, such forfeiture provisions are common in practice (see Dahiya and Yermack (2008)).
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A. Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1
This is a direct corollary of Theorem 2.
Proof of Proposition 1
The present value of future pay on the equilibrium path is given byAt = Et
[∑T
s=t e
−R(s−t)cs
]
,
where ct = c0e
∑t
s=1θsrs+ks . We have At−1 − ct−1 = e−REt−1 [At]. The contract in Theorem 1
implies At = Et−1 [At] eθtrt/Et−1
[
eθtrt
]
. Thus,
At = (At−1 − ct−1) eR
eθtrt
Et−1 [eθtrt ]
.
At is obtained by investing the residual value At−1− ct−1 in a continuously rebalanced portfolio
with a proportion θt in stock and the remainder in interest-bearing cash. ($1 invested at time
t− 1 in such an asset yields eReθtrt/Et−1
[
eθtrt
]
, because both stock and cash have an expected
return of R.) This is precisely the implementation via a DIA.
To derive the vesting fractions, we have
αt = ct/At = ct/Et
[
T∑
s=t
e−R(s−t)cs
]
(A.1)
= 1/Et
[
T∑
s=t
e−R(s−t)e
∑s
n=t+1 θnηn+kn
]
In certain benchmark cases these terms collapse into simple expressions:
(i) If private saving is impossible, the IEE gives us that inverse discounted marginal util-
ity ρ−te−Rtct is a martingale. Thus At = ct
(
1− ρT−t
)
/ (1− ρ) which yields αt = ct/At =
(1− ρ) /
(
1− ρT−t
)
.
(ii) If private saving is possible and the model horizon is infinite, the problem is stationary;
given CRRA, the CEO consumes a constant fraction α of his wealth in each period and so
ct = αAt. We have:
ks = R + ln ρ+ lnE
[
e−θ(ā+η)
]
,
E
[
eθrs+ks
]
= E
[
eθη
]
eRρE
[
e−θη
]
= eRρ∗,
where
ρ∗ = ρE
[
eθη
]
E
[
e−θη
]
.
Hence, for s ≥ t,
Et
[
e−R(s−t)cs
]
= ctρ
s−t
∗
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and
At = Et
[ ∞∑
s=t
e−R(s−t)csds
]
= Et
[ ∞∑
s=t
ρs−t∗ ctds
]
= ct/ (1− ρ∗) .
This yields α = ct/At = 1− ρE
[
eθη
]
E
[
e−θη
]
as required.
Proof of Theorem 2
Case t > L. For t > L, rt is independent of the CEO’s actions. Since the CEO is strictly
risk averse, ct will depend only on r1, ..., rL. Therefore either the PS constraint (6) or the IEE
(if γ = 1) immediately give
ln ct(r1, ..., rt) = ln cL(r1, ..., rL) + κ
′
t, (A.2)
for some constants κ′t independent of the returns.
Case t ≤ L. Suppose that for all t′, T ≥ t′ > t, the optimal contract ct′ is such that
ln ct′(r1, ..., rt′) = B(r1, ..., rt) + θt′rt′ +
t′−1∑
s=t+1
(θs − φθs+1)rs + κt′ , (A.3)
for some function B, constants κt, and θs as in the Theorem. The PS constraint yields
c−γt = e
RJt+1
Jt
Et
[
c−γt+1
]
= Et
[
e−γθt+1rt+1
]
e−γB(r1,...,rt)+R−γκt+1+ln Jt+1−ln Jt . (A.4)
We therefore have24
ln ct = B(r1, ..., rt) + φθt+1rt + κt, (A.5)
for the appropriate constant κt.
The EF constraint requires that in the case when a∗t ∈ (0, a)
0 ∈ arg max
ε
U(r1, ..., rt−1, a
∗
t + ηt + ε). (A.6)
Since g is differentiable, this yields (5) (see EG, Lemma 6), i.e.,
Jtc
1−γ
t φθt+1 +
d
dε
B (r1, ...rt−1, a
∗
t + ηt + ε)
T∑
m=t
JmEt
(
c1−γm
)
= Jtct
1−γg′(a∗t ), (A.7)
d
dε
B (r1, ...rt−1, a
∗
t + ηt + ε) =
Jt (g
′(a∗t )− φθt+1)∑T
m=t Jm
∏m
n=t+1Et
[
e(1−γ)[θn(εn+a
∗
n−φa∗n−1)+(κn−κn−1)]
] := θt − φθt+1.
The second equivalence above follows from the fact that for m > t
Et
[
c1−γm
]
= c1−γt Et
[
e(1−γ)
∑m
n=t+1[θn(εn+a∗n−φa∗n−1)+(κn−κn−1)]
]
= c1−γt
m∏
n=t+1
Et
[
e(1−γ)[θn(εn++a
∗
n−φa∗n−1)+(κn−κn−1)]
]
.
24Equation (A.5) can also be derived from the IEE if γ = 1.
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In the case when a∗t = a in an analogous way we get:
d
dε−
B (r1, ...rt−1, a+ ηt + ε) ≥
Jt (g
′(a)− φθt+1)∑T
m=t Jm
∏m
n=t+1Et
[
e(1−γ)[θn(εn+a
∗
n−φa∗n−1)+(κn−κn−1)]
] (A.8)
We now show that (A.8) binds. First, (A.8) implies that for any r′ ≥ r (see EG, Lemma 4)
Bt (r1, ...rt−1, r
′)−Bt (r1, ...rt−1, r) ≥ (θt − φθt+1)(r′ − r), (A.9)
and it can be inductively shown that 0 ≤ θt − φθt+1 ≤ g′(a). Consider now the contract
(c0s)s≤T that coincides with (cs)s≤T for s < t, and for s ≥ t c0s are as in (A.3) and (A.5) with
B(r1, ..., rt) = B(r1, ..., rt−1) + (θt − φθt+1)rt, where B(r1, ..., rt−1) is chosen to satisfy
Et−1
[
(c0t )
1−γ
(r1, ..., rt)
1− γ
]
= Et−1
[
(ct)
1−γ (r1, ..., rt)
1− γ
]
. (A.10)
Condition (A.9) guarantees that the random variable ln ct (r1, ...rt−1, r̃t) is weakly more dis-
persed than ln c0t (r1, ...rL−1, r̃L) . It also follows from the EF that both ln ct (r1, ...rt−1, ·) and
ln c0t (r1, ...rt−1, ·) are weakly increasing. These facts, together with (A.10), imply that for the
convex function ψ and increasing function ξ, where ψ−1(x) = x
1−γ
1−γ , ξ(x) =
e(1−γ)x
1−γ for γ 6= 1 and
ψ(x) = ex, ξ(x) = x for γ = 1, we have (see EG, Lemmas 1 and 2):
Et−1[c
0
t (r1, ..., rt)] = Et−1
[
ψ ◦ ξ ◦ ln c0t (r1, ..., rt)
]
≤ Et−1 [ψ ◦ ξ ◦ ln ct(r1, ..., rt)] = Et−1[ct(r1, ..., rt)].
In the same way we show that Et−1[c0s(r1, ..., rs)] ≤ Et−1[cs(r1, ..., rs)] for any s ≥ t. Conse-
quently the contract (c0s)s≤T is cheaper than (cs)s≤T , and so indeed (A.8) must bind.
Integrating out this equality we establish that for t′ ≥ t,
ln ct′(r1, ..., rt′) = B(r1, ..., rt−1) + θt′rt′ +
t′−1∑
s=t
(θs − φθs+1)rs + κt′ ,
where θs are as required. Writing κ0 = ln c0 and ks = κs − κs−1 establishes (24).
We now determine the values of the constants ks. First, we have c
−γ
0 = e
−γ ln c0 = eRtJtE
[
c−γt
]
for t ≤ T for all t. This yields, for all t:
γ
t∑
s=1
ks = Rt+ ln Jt +
t∑
s=1
lnE
[
e−γθs(εs+a
∗
s−φa∗s−1)
]
,
yielding (26). When the PS constraint is not imposed, we use (7) to derive (10) analogously.
Equation (25) becomes simpler in the limit case L = T = ∞ when a∗t = a ∀t. Then
the problem is stationary, and θ and k are constant. To characterize them, define f(θ) =
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E
[
e(1−γ)[θ(ε+ā(1−φ))+k]
]
where γk = R + ln ρ+ lnE
[
e−γθ(ε+ā(1−φ))
]
, so that
f(θ) = E
[
e(1−γ)θε
] (
E
[
e−γθε
]) 1−γ
γ e
1−γ
γ
(R+ln ρ).
Then from (25), we have θ = g
′(ā)−φθ∑∞
s=t[ρf(θ)]
s−t + φθ, i.e.,
θ = (g′(ā)− φθ)(1− ρf(θ)) + φθ. (A.11)
In the limit of small time intervals, when φ = 0, θ satisfies:
θ = g′(ā)
(
− ln ρ+ γ − 1
γ
(R + ln ρ) +
γ − 1
2
θ2σ2
)
= g′(ā)
(
(γ − 1)R− ln ρ
γ
+
γ − 1
2
θ2σ2
)
The value of θ is the root that goes to a finite limit as γ → 1:
θ =
1−
√
1− 2(γ − 1)σ2g′(ā)2 (γ−1)R−ln ρ
γ
(γ − 1)σ2g′(ā) (A.12)
Indeed, as γ → 1, θ → g′(ā) (− ln ρ), which is the solution from the log case in the limit of
small time intervals.
Proof of Theorem 3
We divide the proof into the following steps.
Step 1. Change of variables. Consider the new variable xt, t ≤ L, and per period utility
functions u(ct, xt) defined as:
xt =
{
−g(at) if γ = 1
e−g(at)
1−γ
γ β if γ 6= 1
, u(ct, xt) =
{
ln ct + xt if γ = 1
ct1−γ(βxt)γ
1−γ if γ 6= 1
,
where β = sign(1 − γ), and let at = f(xt). xt measures the agent’s leisure and f is the
“production function”from leisure to effort, which is decreasing and concave. The new variables
are chosen so that u (c, x) is jointly concave in both arguments.
Let U
(
(ct)t≤T , (xt)t≤L
)
=
∑T
t=1 ρ
tu(ct, xt) be total discounted utility and consider the max-
imization problem:
max
xt,ct adapted
E
[
U
(
(ct)t≤T , (xt)t≤L
)]
, (A.13)
with
∑T
t=1 e
−rt (yt − ct) ≥ 0 and yt satisfying
ln yt = ln c0 +
t∑
s=1
θs(ηs + f(xs)− φ(ηs−1 + f(xs−1))) +
t∑
s=1
ks, (A.14)
for f(xs) = a∗s for s > L. Problems (A.13) and (30) are equivalent: (xt)t≤L and (ct)t≤T solve
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(A.13) if and only if (f(xt))t≤L and (ct)t≤T solve (30). The utility function U
(
(ct)t≤T , (xt)t≤L
)
is jointly concave in (ct)t≤T and (xt)t≤L.
Step 2. Deriving an “upper linearization” utility function. Consider c∗t (η) =
c0 exp
(∑t
s=1 θs(ηs + f(x
∗
s)− φ(ηs−1 + f(x∗s−1))) +
∑t
s=1 ks
)
, the consumption for the recom-
mended sequence of leisure on the path of noises η = (ηt)t≤T (where f(x∗t ) = a
∗
t ), under
no saving. For any path of noises η = (ηt)t≤T we introduce the “upper linearization”utility
function Ûη:
Ûη
(
(ct)t≤T , (xt)t≤L
)
= U +
T∑
t=1
(ct − c∗t (η))
∂U
∂ct
+
L∑
t=1
(xt − x∗t )
∂U
∂xt
, (A.15)
where U, ∂U
∂ct
and ∂U
∂xt
are evaluated at the (noise dependent) target consumption and leisure
levels (c∗t (η))t≤T , (x
∗
t )t≤L). Since U = U
(
(ct)t≤T , (xt)t≤L
)
is jointly concave in (ct)t≤T and
(xt)t≤L, we have:
Ûη
(
(ct)t≤T , (xt)t≤L
)
≥ U
(
(ct)t≤T , (xt)t≤L
)
for all paths η, (ct)t≤T , (xt)t≤L.
Ûη
(
(c∗t (η))t≤T , (x
∗
t )t≤L
)
= U
(
(c∗t (η))t≤T , (x
∗
t )t≤L
)
for all paths η.
Hence, to show that there are no profitable deviations for EU , it is suffi cient to show that there
are no profitable deviations for EÛη. Moreover, since
ert
∂Ûη
∂ct
= ert
∂U
(
(c∗t (η))t≤T , (x
∗
t )t≤L
)
∂ct
=
Jt(c
∗
t )
−γ
e−rt
,
when private savings are allowed, the PS constraint (6) implies that ert ∂Ûη
∂ct
is a martingale.
Therefore, the agent is indifferent about when he consumes income yt, and so we can evaluate
EÛη for ct ≡ yt. Since the agent has no motive to save, we only need to show that he has no
motive to change leisure (and thus effort).25 We also let utility be a function of (xt)t≤L since it
fully determines the process of income (yt)t≤T and thus consumption (ct)t≤T .
The results are summarized in the following Lemma.
Lemma 1: (Upper linearization.) Let Ũη ((xt)t≤L) = Ûη
(
(yt)t≤T , (xt)t≤L
)
for Ûη defined as in
(A.15) and yt as in (A.14), and consider the following maximization problem:
max
xt adapted
E
[
Ũη ((xt)t≤L)
]
. (A.16)
If the target leisure level (x∗t )t≤L solves the maximization problem (A.16) then (c
∗
t )t≤T and
(x∗t )t≤L solve the maximization problem (A.13).
25For the same reason, it is satisfactory that we have linearized utility at the recommended consumption level.
Since expected linearized utility does not depend on the agent’s saving strategy, we can evaluate it with respect
to an arbitrary savings strategy such as no saving (i.e. consuming the recommended amount).
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Step 3. Pathwise concavity of utility in leisure for γ = 1. We must demonstrate that
expected utility is jointly concave in leisure (xt)t≤L if the cost function g is suffi ciently convex.
For γ = 1, we can do so by proving pathwise concavity, i.e., that Ûη is concave for every path
of noises. (We will deal with the case γ 6= 1 in step 4). We have:
Ũη ((xt)t≤L) =
T∑
t=1
ρt(ln c∗t (η)− 1) +
L∑
t=1
ρtxt +
T∑
t=1
e
∑t
s=1 θs(f(xs)−a∗s−φ(f(xs−1)−a∗s−1))+t ln ρ. (A.17)
Joint concavity of (A.17) in (xt)t≤L is equivalent to the joint concavity of “PV of income”
function
I ((xt)t≤L) =
T∑
t=1
e
∑t
s=1 θs(f(xs)−a∗s−φ(f(xs−1)−a∗s−1))+t ln ρ. (A.18)
To prove the latter we will use the following general Lemma.
Lemma 2: (Concavity of present values.) Let
I((bt)t≤T ) =
T∑
t=1
e
∑t
s=1 js(bs),
where bs ∈ R and all js are twice differentiable functions. Suppose that for every s:
sup
[
2Cj′2s + j
′′
s
]
≤ 0 (A.19)
for C =
∑T
n=0 e
n sup jt/2. Then the function I is concave.
Loosely speaking, the Lemma states that, if js are suffi ciently concave, then the “present
value of income”function I ((bt)t≤L) associated with them is also jointly concave in the sequence
of decisions (bt)t≤T . This is non-trivial to prove when T →∞: for suffi ciently large t, exp (tj (b))
is a convex function of b, because its second derivative is exp (tj (b)) t
(
tj
′
(b)2 + j′′ (b)
)
, which
is positive for suffi ciently large t. It is discounting (expressed by ρ < 1) that allows the income
function to be concave.
We use Lemma 2 to prove the following result.
Lemma 3: (Concavity of present value of income.) The present value of income
I ((xt)t≤L) =
T∑
t=1
e
∑t
s=1 θs(f(xs)−a∗s−φ(f(xs−1)−a∗s−1))+t ln ρ
is jointly concave in leisure (xt)t≤L.
Step 4. Concavity of expected utility in leisure for γ 6= 1. When γ 6= 1, linearized
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utility Ũη is:
Ũη ((xt)t≤L) =
L∑
t=1
γ
1− γ ρ
tc∗t (η)
1−γ
(
xt
(βx∗t )
1−γ
)
+
T∑
t=1
ρt(βx∗t )
γc1−γ0 e
∑t
s=1 θs(f(xs)−γa∗s−φ(f(xs−1)−γa∗s−1)+(1−γ)εs)+(1−γ)ks . (A.20)
Unlike when γ = 1, the second term in (A.20), i.e., the “PV of income function’, now depends
on noise η. We therefore cannot prove pathwise concavity of linearized utility, and instead
prove concavity of expected utility directly.
Expected utility is given by
E
[
Ũη((xt)t≤L)
]
= E
[
L∑
t=1
Atxt +
T∑
t=1
Mt(η)e
∑t
s=1[θs(f(xs)−γa∗s−φ(f(xs−1)−γa∗s−1))+lnE(e(1−γ)θsεs)+(1−γ)ks]+t ln ρ−(1−γ)g(a∗t )
]
= E
[
L∑
t=1
Atxt +MT (η)
T∑
t=1
e
∑t
s=1[θs(f(xs)−γa∗s−φ(f(xs−1)−γa∗s−1))+lnE(e(1−γ)θsεs)+(1−γ)ks]+t ln ρ−(1−γ)g(a∗t )
]
,
where Mt(η) = e
∑t
s=1[(1−γ)θsεs−lnE(e(1−γ)θsεs)]+(1−γ) ln c0 is a martingale. The second equality
follows from the law of iterated expectations and Mt(η) being a martingale.
We use Lemma 2 to prove the following result.
Lemma 4: (Concavity of modified present value of income.) The modified present value of
income
I ′((xt)t≤L) =
T∑
t=1
e
∑t
s=1[θs(f(xs)−γa∗s−φ(f(xs−1)−γa∗s−1))+lnE(e(1−γ)θsεs)+(1−γ)ks]+t ln ρ−(1−γ)g(a∗t ),
for f(xs) = a∗s if s > L, is pathwise jointly concave in leisure (xt)t≤L.
We now conclude the proof of the Theorem. From Theorem 2, EŨη satisfies the first-order
conditions at (x∗t )t≤L. From step 4, EŨη is also concave in (xt)t≤L, and so the target leisure
level (x∗t )t≤L solves the maximization problem (A.16). Therefore, from Lemma 1, (c
∗
t )t≤T and
(x∗t )t≤L solve the maximization problem (A.13), establishing the result.
Proof of Theorem 4
This proof is in the Internet Appendix.
Proof of Proposition 2
We now impose the NM constraint. Proceeding inductively as in the proof of Theorem 2,
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we have a contract of the form:
ln ct = ln c0 +
t∑
s=1
θsrs +
t∑
s=1
kt,
with kt as in the statement of Proposition 2, and θt deterministic lowest nonnegative values
such that the EF and NM constraints are satisfied, i.e.:
EF : g′(ā) ≤ θt
(
1 + ρ+ . . . ρT−t
)
for t ≤ L, (A.21)
NM : θt
(
ρt+...+ ρT
)
qi ≤ θt+i
(
ρt+i+...+ ρT
)
, for 0 ≤ t ≤ L, 0 ≤ i ≤M. (A.22)
Defining ζt = θt
(
1 + ρ+ . . . ρT−t
)
, this can be rewritten:
g′(ā) ≤ ζt for t ≤ L
ζtqi ≤ ρiζt+i for 0 ≤ t ≤ L, 0 ≤ i ≤M
This yields the values described in the Proposition.
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Internet Appendix for “Dynamic CEO Compensation”
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B. Continuous Time
We now consider the continuous-time analog of the model, assuming a∗t = a ∀ t (from
Theorem 4). The CEO’s utility is given by:
U =
 E
[∫ T
0
ρt (cth(at))
1−γ−1
1−γ dt
]
if γ 6= 1
E
[∫ T
0
ρt (ln ct + lnh (at)) dt
]
if γ = 1.
(B.1)
The firm’s returns evolve according to:
dRt = atdt+ σtdZt
where Zt is a Brownian motion, and the volatility process σt is deterministic. We normalize
r0 = 0 and the risk premium to zero, i.e., the expected rate of return on the stock is R in each
period.
Proposition 3 (Optimal contract, continuous time, log utility). The continuous-time limit of
the optimal contract pays the CEO ct at each instant, where ct satisfies:
ln ct =
∫ t
0
θsdRs + κt, (B.2)
where θs and κt are deterministic functions. If short-termism is impossible, the sensitivity θt is
given by:
θt =
{
g′(a)∫ T
t ρ
τ−sds
for t ≤ L
0 for t > L
. (B.3)
If short-termism is possible, θt is given by:
θt =
{
ζt∫ T
t ρ
τ−sds
for t ≤ L+M
0 for t > L+M
, (B.4)
where:
ζs =
 max0<i≤M
{
g′(ā), qi
ρi
ζs−i
}
for s ≤ L
maxs−L≤i≤M
{
qi
ρi
ζs−i
}
for L < s ≤ L+M
.
If private saving is impossible, the constant κt is given by
κt = (R + ln ρ) t−
∫ t
0
θsE [dRs]−
∫ t
0
θ2sσ
2
s
2
ds+ κ. (B.5)
46
If private saving is possible, κt is given by
κt = (R + ln ρ) t−
∫ t
0
θsE [dRs] +
∫ t
0
θ2sσ
2
s
2
ds+ κ. (B.6)
where κ ensures that the agent is at his reservation utility.
Proposition 4 (Optimal contract, continuous time, general CRRA utility, with PS constraint).
Let σt denote the stock volatility. The optimal contract pays the CEO ct at each instant, where
ct satisfies:
ln ct =
∫ t
0
θsdRs + κt, (B.7)
where θs and κt are deterministic functions. The continuous-time limit of the optimal contract
is the following. The sensitivity θt is given by:
θt =
ρte−(1−γ)g(ā)g′(ā)∫ T
t
ρse−(1−γ)g(ā)+(1−γ)(κs−κt)Et
[
e(1−γ)
∫ s
t θτdRτ
]
ds
for t ≤ L, (B.8)
θt = 0 for t > L.
The value of κt is:
γκt = (R + ln ρ)t− (1− γ)g(a)1t≥L − γ
∫ t
0
θsads+
1
2
γ2
∫ t
0
θ2sσ
2
sds+ κ, (B.9)
where κ ensures that the agent is at his reservation utility.
The implications of the optimal contract are the same as for discrete time, except that the
rebalancing of the account is now continuous. As in the discrete time case, the expressions
become simpler if L = T =∞. We have
θ =
g′(ā)∫∞
t
ρs−tek(1−γ)(s−t)e(1−γ)θā(s−t)+
1
2
(1−γ)2θ2σ2(s−t)ds
.
Define
v(θ) = ln ρ+ k(1− γ) + (1− γ)θā+ 1
2
(1− γ)2θ2σ2
where
γk = (R + ln ρ)t− γθā+ 1
2
γ2θ2σ2.
We obtain the definition
v(θ) = − ln ρ+ γ − 1
γ
(R + ln ρ) +
γ − 1
2
θ2σ2
=
(γ − 1)R− ln ρ
γ
+
γ − 1
2
θ2σ2.
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We then have θ = g
′(ā)∫∞
t e
−v(θ)(s−t)ds
, i.e.,
θ = g′(ā)v(θ).
The solution is the one in the discrete time model in the main paper, (27).
C. Analysis of Theorem 2
This section provides the analysis behind the comparative statics of the determinants of θt,
discussed in the main paper shortly after Theorem 2. To study the impact of volatility on the
contract, we parameterize the innovations by εt = σε′t, where σ indicates volatility. We define
the function:
G (θ, γ, σ) =
γ − 1
γ
lnE
[
e−γθσε
′
]
− lnE
[
e(1−γ)σθε
′
]
in the domain θ ≥ 0, σ ≥ 0, γ ≥ 1. For instance, when ε′ is a standard normal, G (θ, γ, σ) =
θ2σ2 γ−1
2
, and G is increasing in θ, γ, and σ.
We also define
H (θ, γ, σ) = G (θ, γ, σ)− ln ρ+R
γ
If ln ρ+R is suffi ciently close to 0, then H (θ, γ, σ) is increasing in in θ, γ, σ.
Lemma 5: Consider the domain θ ≥ 0, σ ≥ 0, γ ≥ 1, in the case where φ = 0, T = L and
a∗t = a
∗ ∀t. Suppose that H (θ, γ, σ) is increasing in its arguments in that domain. Then,
θT = g
′ (a∗), and for t < T , θt is increasing in γ, in σ, and decreasing in ρ. If H (θ, γ, σ) is
close enough to 0, then θt is increasing in t.
The lemma means that the sensitivity profile is increasing, and becomes flatter as γ and
σ are higher. The intuition is thus: a higher γ, a higher σ, or a lower ρ, tend to decrease the
relative importance of future consumptions E
[
ρtc1−γt
]
. Hence, it is important to give a higher
sensitivity to the agent early on. By contrast, when γ is low, future consumptions are more
important and so it is suffi cient to give a lower sensitivity early on.
Proof Using Theorem 2, simple calculations show, for t ≤ L,
θt =
g′ (a∗)∑T
s=t ρ
s−t∏s
n=t+1 e
−G(θn,γ,σ)+ 1−γγ (R+ln ρ)
=
g′ (a∗)∑T
s=t
∏s
n=t+1 e
−G(θn,γ,σ)+ 1−γγ R+
1
γ
ln ρ
θt =
g′ (a∗)∑T
s=t e
−
∑s
n=t+1(H(θn,γ,σ)+R)
(C.1)
We have θT = g′ (a∗). Proceeding by backward induction on t, starting at t = T , we see
that θt is increasing in γ: this is because a higher γ increases H (θn, γ, σ) via the direct effect
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on H, and the effect on the future θn (n > t), so it increases θt. The same reasoning holds for
the comparative statics with respect to σ and ρ.
The last part of Lemma 5:
comes from the fact that when H → 0, θt → g
′(a∗)∑T
s=t e
−R(t−s) , which is increasing in t.
Another tractable case is the infinite horizon limit, where T = L→∞. Since the problem
is stationary, θt is equal to a limit θ. From (C.1), this satisfies:
θ = g′ (a∗)
(
1− e−H(θ,γ,σ)−R
)
.
For instance, in the continuous-time, Gaussian noise limit,
θ = g′ (a∗)
[
θ2σ2
γ − 1
2
− ln ρ+R
γ
+R
]
.
which gives the solution (27). The sensitivity of incentives (θ) is higher when the agent is more
risk-averse (higher γ, provided ln ρ+R is close enough to 0), there is more risk (higher σ), and
the agent is less patient (lower ρ).
D. Variable Cost of Effort
This section extends the core model to allow a deterministically varying marginal cost of
effort. In practice, this occurs if either the cost function or high effort level changes over time.
For example, for a start-up firm, the CEO can undertake many actions to improve firm value
(augmenting the boundary effort level) and effort is relatively productive (reducing the cost of
effort). However, the scope and productivity of effort declines as the firm matures.
We now allow for a time-varying boundary effort level at and cost of effort gt (·). The
sensitivity of the contract in Theorem 1 and Proposition 2 (equations (9) and (33)) now becomes:
θt =
{
g′t(āt)
1+ρ+...ρT−t for t ≤ L
0 for t > L
, (D.1)
if myopia is impossible, and if myopia is possible
θt =
{
ζt
1+ρ+...ρT−t for t ≤ L+M
0 for t > L+M
, . (D.2)
where
ζs =
 max1≤i≤M
{
g′s(ās),
qi
ρi
ζs−i
}
for s ≤ L
maxs−L≤i≤M
{
qi
ρi
ζs−i
}
for L < s ≤ L+M
.
With a non-constant marginal cost of effort, the contract sensitivity θt is time-varying, even
in an infinite-horizon model. In particular, θt is high in the periods in which g′t (āt) is high. Let
s ≤ L denote the period in which g′t (āt) is highest. Even if there is no discounting (ρi = 1),
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the CEO may have an incentive to increase rs at the expense of the signal in period j (where
j ≤ s + M), if the difference in slopes θs and θj is suffi cient to outweigh the ineffi ciency of
earnings inflation (qi < 1). Thus, the sensitivity θj will have to rise to be suffi ciently close to θs
to deter such myopia. However, this in turn has a knock-on effect: since θj has now risen, the
CEO may have an incentive to increase rj at the expense of rk (where k ≤ j + M) and so on.
Therefore, if qi is suffi ciently high (to make myopia attractive), the high sensitivity at s forces
upward the sensitivity in all periods t ≤ L+M , even those more than M periods away from s,
owing to the knock-on effects. This “resonance”explains the recursive formulation in equation
(D.2), where a high g′t (āt) may affect the sensitivity for all t ≤ L+M .
This dependence can be illustrated in a numerical example. We set T = 5, L = 3, ρ = 1,
g′1 (a1) = 2 and g
′
2 (a2) = g
′
3 (a3) = 1. If myopia is impossible, the optimal contract is
ln c1 =
2
5
r1 + κ1
ln c2 =
2
5
r1 +
r2
4
+ κ2
ln c3 =
2
5
r1 +
r2
4
+
r3
3
+ κ3
ln c4 =
2
5
r1 +
r2
4
+
r3
3
+ κ4
ln c5 =
2
5
r1 +
r2
4
+
r3
3
+ κ5.
Since the marginal cost of effort is high at t = 1, the contract sensitivity must be high at t = 1
to satisfy the EF condition. However, this now gives the CEO incentives to engage in myopia
if it were possible. Assume M = 1 and q1 > 1√2 . If he engages in myopia that increases r1 by
q units and reduces r2 by 1 unit, lifetime consumption rises by 2q1 units from the former and
falls by 1 unit from the latter. Therefore, the sensitivity of the contract at t = 2 must increase
to remove these incentives. The sensitivity is now q1
2
per period to give a total lifetime reward
of 2q1. This increased sensitivity at t = 2 in turn augments the required sensitivity at t = 3,
else the CEO would inflate r2 at the expense of r3: θ3 now becomes
2q21
3
> 1
3
. Therefore, even
though the maximum release lag M is 1 and so the CEO cannot take any actions to inflate r1
at the expense of r3, the high sensitivity at r1 still affects the sensitivity at r3 by changing the
sensitivity at r2. Finally, the contract must remain sensitive to firm returns beyond retirement,
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to deter the CEO from inflating r3 at the expense of r4. The new contract is given by:
ln c1 =
2
5
r1 + κ1
ln c2 =
2
5
r1 +
q1
2
r2 + κ2
ln c3 =
2
5
r1 +
q1
2
r2 +
2q21
3
r3 + κ3
ln c4 =
2
5
r1 +
q1
2
r2 +
2q21
3
r3 + q
3
1r4 + κ4
ln c5 =
2
5
r1 +
q1
2
r2 +
2q21
3
r3 + q
3
1r4 + κ5.
This result contrasts with the example in Section B.1 where the possibility of myopia did
not change the contract for t ≤ L under no discounting and a constant marginal cost of effort.
E. Additional Proofs
This section contains proofs of lemmas, corollaries and other claims in the main paper.
A. Proof of Corollary 1
As L = T =∞ so that we have a constant θs = θ and ks = k. For notational simplicity we
normalize (without loss of generality) u = 0 and ā = 0. The expected cost of the contract is:
C = E
[ ∞∑
t=1
e−Rtct
]
=
∞∑
t=1
E
[
exp
(
−Rt+ ln c0 +
t∑
s=1
θsrs +
t∑
s=1
ks
)]
=
∞∑
t=1
exp
((
k −R + lnE
[
eθη
])
t+ ln c0
)
= c0
ek−R+lnE[e
θη]
1− ek−R+lnE[eθη]
The value of c0 is pinned down by the participation constraint:
0 = u = E
[ ∞∑
t=1
ρt ln ct
]
=
∞∑
t=1
ρt
[
ln c0 +
t∑
s=1
θsā+
t∑
s=1
ks
]
=
∞∑
t=1
ρt [ln c0 + kt]
=
ρ
1− ρ ln c0 +
ρ
(1− ρ)2
k
so that: ln c0 = − 11−ρk. Hence
C = e−
1
1−ρk
ek−R+lnE[e
θη]
1− ek−R+lnE[eθη]
.
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For the contract without PS, we have k = R + ln ρ− lnE
[
eθη
]
, so
CNPS = e−
1
1−ρ(R+ln ρ−lnE[eθη]) ρ
1− ρ.
For the contract with PS, we have k = R + ln ρ+ lnE
[
e−θη
]
, so
CPS = e−
1
1−ρ(R+ln ρ+lnE[e−θη]) ρe
lnE[e−θη]+lnE[eθη]
1− ρelnE[e−θη]+lnE[eθη]
.
Thus,
Λ =
CPS
CNPS =
(1− ρ) e−
ρ
1−ρ(lnE[e−θη]+lnE[e+θη])
1− ρelnE[e−θη]+lnE[eθη]
=
1− ρ
1− ρeΘ2σ2 e
− ρΘ
2σ2
1−ρ
In the limit of small time intervals, lnE
[
e−θη
]
+ lnE
[
e+θη
]
∼ θ2σ2, and 1−ρ = δ are small
(proportional to the time interval ∆t), and θ ∼ g′ (a) δ, so
Λ ∼ δe
−ρσ2θ2/(1−ρ)
1− (1− δ) (1 + θ2σ2) ∼
δe−σ
2θ2/(1−ρ)
δ − θ2σ2 =
e−σ
2θ2/(1−ρ)
1− θ2σ2
1−ρ
.
B. Proof of Theorem 4
We wish to show that, if baseline firm size X is suffi ciently large, the optimal contract
implements high effort (at ≡ a for all t).
Fix any contract (A, Y ) that is incentive compatible and gives expected utility u, where
A = (a1, ..., aL) is the effort schedule, at : [η, η]t → [0, a], and Y = (y1, ..., yT ) is the payoff
schedule, yt : [η, η]t → R. The timing in each period is as follows: the agent reports noise
ηt, then is supposed to exert effort at(η1, ..., ηt). If the return is ηt + at(η1, ..., ηt) he receives
payoffyt(η1, ..., ηt), else he receives a payoffthat is suffi ciently low to deter such “off-equilibrium”
deviations. We require this richer framework, since in general the noises might not be identifiable
from observed returns (when ηt + at(η1, ..., ηt) = η′t + at(η1, ..., ηt−1, η
′
t) for ηt 6= η′t ). Note that
the required low payoff may be negative. A limited liability constraint would be simple to
address, e.g., by imposing a lower bound on η. We will denote (η1, ..., ηt) by ηt.
To establish the result it is suffi cient to show that we can find a different contract (A∗, Y ∗)
that implements high effort (at ≡ a for all t), and is not significantly costlier than (A, Y ), in
the sense that
E
[
T∑
t=1
e−rt(y∗t (ηt)− yt(ηt))
]
≤ h(E [a− a1(η1)] , ..., E [a− aL(ηL)]), (E.1)
for some linear function h, h : RL → R, with h(0, ..., 0) = 0. This is suffi cient, because if
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initial firm size X is suffi ciently large, then for every sequence of noises and actions, firm value
Xe
∑t−1
s=1(ηs+as(ηs))+η is greater than D, where D is the highest sensitivity coeffi cient of h. This
in turn implies
Xe
∑t−1
s=1(ηs+as(ηs))+η × E
[
ea − eat(ηt)
]
≥ D × E [a− at(ηt)] , (E.2)
and so the benefits of implementing high effort outweigh the costs, i.e., the RHS of (E.1) exceeds
the LHS of (E.1). To keep the proof concise we assume ρer = 1, T = L and the noises ηt are
independent across time. The general case is proven along analogously.
We introduce the following notation. For any contract (A, Y ) and history ηt let ut(ηt) =
[yt(ηt)e−g(at(ηt))]1−γ
1−γ (or ut(ηt) = ln yt(ηt)− g(at(ηt)) for γ = 1) denote the CEO’s stage game util-
ity for truthful reporting in period t after history ηt when he consumes his income, let Ut(ηt) =
Et
[∑L
s=t ρ
s−tus(ηs)
]
denote his continuation utility, and mut(ηt) = y
−γ
t (ηt)e
−(1−γ)g(at(ηt)) de-
note his marginal utility of consumption. We divide the proof into the following six steps.
Step 1. Local necessary conditions. First, we generalize the local effort constraint (5)
to contracts that need not implement high effort.
Lemma 6: Fix an incentive compatible contract (A, Y ), with each at(ηt−1, ·) continuous almost
everywhere and bounded on every compact subinterval, and a history ηt−1. The CEO’s contin-
uation utility Ut(ηt−1, ηt) must satisfy the following:
Ut(ηt−1, ηt) = Ut(ηt−1, η) +
∫ ηt
η
[yt(ηt−1, x)e
−g(at(ηt−1,x))]1−γg′(at(ηt−1, x))dx, (E.3)
with yt(ηt) > 0.
Step 2. Bound on the cost of incentives per period. For any history ηt−1 and
contract (A, Y ), consider “repairing”the contract at time t as follows. Following any history
ηt−1, η, multiply all the payoffs by the appropriate constant ζ(ηt−1, η) such that the continuation
utilities U#t (ηt−1, ηt) for the resulting contract satisfy (E.3) with at(ηt−1, ηt) = a for all ηt. In
other words, the local EF constraint for high effort at time t after history ηt−1 is satisfied. The
following Lemma bounds the expectation of how much we have to scale up the payoffs by the
expectation of how much the target effort falls short of the boundary effort level.
Lemma 7: Fix an incentive compatible contract (A, Y ) and a history ηt−1, and consider the
contract (A#, Y #) such that:
a#t (ηt−1, ηt) = a for all ηt, else a
#
s ≡ as,
y#s (ηs) = ys(ηs)× ζ(ηt−1, ηt) if ηs|t = ηt−1, ηt, and else y#s (ηs) ≡ ys(ηs),
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where ζ(ηt−1, ηt) ≥ 1 is the unique number such that U
#
t (ηt−1, η) = Ut(ηt−1, η) and
U#t (ηt−1, ηt) = U
#
t (ηt−1, η) +
∫ ηt
η
[ζ(ηt−1, x)yt(ηt−1, x)e
−g(a)]1−γg′(a)dx. (E.4)
Then:
Et−1
[
ζ(ηt−1, ηt)
]
≤ ϕ(Et−1 [a− at(ηt)]), (E.5)
where ϕ(x) = eg
′(a) sup g
′′
fg′2 x
(
1 + 1γ<1e
g(a)−g(a)g′(a)(1− γ)x
)
for γ 6= 1,
ϕ(x) = e
g′(a) sup g
′′
fg′2 x
(
1 + eg(a)−g(a)g′(a)x
)
for γ = 1, and f is the pdf of noise η.
Step 3. Constructing the contract that satisfies the local EF constraint in every
period. We want to use the procedure from step 2 to construct a new contract (Ax, Y x) that
implements high effort, satisfies the local EF in every period, and has a cost difference over
(A, Y ) that is bounded by how much (A, Y ) falls short of the contract that implements high
effort. For this we need the following Lemma.
Lemma 8: For a contract (A, Y ) and any ζ > 0 consider the contract (A, ζY ) in which all the
payoffs are multiplied by ζ,
i) if (A, Y ) satisfies the local EF constraint then so does (A, ζY );
ii) if (A, Y ) satisfies the local PS constraint then so does (A, ζY ).
Given an incentive compatible contract (A, Y ), we construct the contract (Ax, Y x) as follows.
The contract always prescribes high effort. Regarding the payoffs, for any period t after a history
ηt−1 we first multiply all payoffs after history (ηt−1, η) with fixed constants ζ(ηt−1, η) > 1 as
in Lemma 7 so that the resulting utilities U#t (ηt) satisfy (E.4). Then we multiply all payoffs
following history ηt−1 by the appropriate constant ζ
pu(ηt−1) < 1 so that for the resulting
contract (Ax, Y x) we obtain the original promised utility, i.e., Ut−1(ηt−1) = U
x
t−1(ηt−1). By
construction and the above Lemmas, the contract (Ax, Y x) satisfies the local EF constraint. In
particular, due to Lemma 8, repairing the contract after history ηt−1 will not upset the local
EF constraint after history
(
ηt−1; ηt
)
.
The original contract (A, Y ) satisfies the local PS constraint, i.e., the current marginal utility
of consumption always equals the next-period expected marginal utility. Providing incentives
for high effort in contract (Ax, Y x) upsets this condition. In the following two steps, given
(Ax, Y x), we construct the contract (A∗, Y ∗) that also satisfies the local PS constraint and
is not much costlier. In particular, we show that the extent to which the marginal utilities of
consumption in (A∗, Y ∗) depart from the marginal utilities in (Ax, Y x) is bounded by the extent
to which effort falls short of the high effort level in contract (A, Y ).
Step 4. Bound on the decrease of expected MU of consumption per period. We
split this step into two Lemmas. The first bounds the expected decrease in marginal utility
of consumption from providing incentives for high effort in the current period, as in step 2.
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The second bounds the decrease in expected marginal utility by the expected decrease of the
marginal utility.
Lemma 9: Fix any history ηt−1 and look at the original contract (A, Y ) and the contract
(A#, Y #) from step 1. Then:
Et−1
[
mu#t (ηt−1, ηt)
mut(ηt−1, ηt)
]
≥
e
−γg′(a) sup g
′′
fg′2Et−1[a−at(ηt)]
(
1− 1γ<1e−(1+γ)(1−γ)[g(a)−g(a)]g′(a)(1− γ)(1 + γ)Et−1 [a− at(ηt)]
)
.
Lemma 10: Fix any history ηt−1 and look at any two contracts (A
l, Y l) (Ah, Y h) with positive
payoffs that satisfy (E.3) and for every ηt, mult(ηt−1, ηt) ≤ muht (ηt−1, ηt). Then, for some
D2 > 0 :
Et−1
[
mult(ηt−1, ηt)
]
Et−1
[
muht (ηt−1, ηt)
] ≥ 1−D2(1− Et−1 [mult(ηt−1, ηt)
muht (ηt−1, ηt)
])
.
Step 5. Constructing the contract that satisfies the local PS constraint in every
period. Providing incentives for high effort in (Ax, Y x) at (say) time L affects the marginal
utility of consumption in period L and upsets the PS constraint in period L − 1. However,
restoring the PS constraint in period L − 1 will affect the marginal utility of consumption in
period L−1 and so upset the PS constraint in period L−2, and so on. In the following Lemma
we bound this overall effect using Lemma 9 and iteratively Lemma 10.
Lemma 11: There is a contract (A∗, Y ∗) that implements maximal effort and satisfies the local
EF and PS constraints, and for every history ηt:
mu∗t (ηt)
muxt (ηt)
≥
L∏
s=t+1
φs−t(Et [ψ (Es−1 [a− as(ηs)])]), (E.6)
where φ(x) = 1−D2 (1− x) , ψ(x) = e−γg
′(a) sup g
′′
fg′2 x
(
1− 1γ<1e−(1+γ)(1−γ)[g(a)−g(a)]g′(a)(1− γ)(1 + γ)x
)
.
Step 6. Bounding the cost difference (E.1). By construction, contract (A∗, Y ∗) from
Lemma 11 implements high effort, causes the local EF constraint to bind, satisfies the local PS
constraint and leaves the CEO with the expected discounted utility u. Therefore it is identical
to the contract from Theorem 2, and so also satisfies the global constraints (Theorem 3). It
therefore remains to prove (E.1).
One can verify that for some D3 > 0 for every history ηt we have y
∗
t (ηt) < D3. Moreover,
for any a, b, c ∈ R,
a− b ≤ a
(
max{a− c
c
, 0}+ max{c− b
b
, 0}
)
= a
(
max{a
c
, 1} − 1 + max{c
b
, 1} − 1
)
.
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Consequently,
E
[
L∑
t=1
e−rt(y∗t (ηt)− yt(ηt))
]
≤ D3 × E
[
L∑
t=1
e−rt
(
max{y
∗
t (ηt)
yxt (ηt)
, 1} − 1 + max{y
x
t (ηt)
yt(ηt)
, 1} − 1
)]
≤
≤ D3 × E
 L∑
t=1
e−rt
( L∏
s=t+1
φs−t(Et [ψ (Es−1 [a− as(ηs)])])
)− 1
γ
− 1 + ϕ (Et−1 [a− at(ηt)])− 1
 ,
where ϕ is as in Lemma 7, while φ and ψ are as in Lemma 11. All functions ϕ, φ, ψ,
∏L
s=t+1 xs
and x−
1
γ are continuously differentiable and take value 1 for argument(s) equal to 1, whereas
a− at(ηt) is bounded. Therefore there is a linear function h : RL → R with h(0, ..., 0) = 0 such
that (E.1) is satisfied.
The above proof is for the case where private saving is possible as this is the more complex
case. If γ = 1 and private saving is impossible, step 4 is not needed and Lemma 11 in step 5
and step 6 become significantly simpler.
C. Contract with CARA Utility and Additive Preferences
With these preferences, the agent has period utility
u(c, a) = −e−γ(c−g(a)).
The derivation of the local constraints and the contract are analogous to the paper. Consider
a two period model with no discounting. From EF we have:
c2(r1, r2) = B(r1) + g
′(a)× r2.
PS yields:
∂U
∂c1
= E1
[
∂U
∂c2
]
e−γ(c1−g(a)) = E1
[
e−γ(B(r1)+g
′(a)×r2−g(a))
]
,
c1 − g(a) = B(r1)− g(a)−
logE1
[
e−γ(g
′(a)×r2)
]
γ
,
c1(r1) = B(r1) + k.
and so we have
c1(r1) = θ1r1 + k1,
c2(r1, r2) = θ1r1 + θ2r2 + k1 + k2,
similar to the main paper.
56
D. Negative Effect of Short-Termism
We show that the condition (31) is suffi cient for myopia to have a negative impact on the
expected terminal dividend. Fix the effort strategy to be the high effort strategy. Consider any
time t and assume that it has been shown that any myopic actions past time t are suboptimal.
We must establish that:
e
∑M
i=1λi(E[mt,i(ηt+i)])E
[
e
∑M
s=t+1
[
ηs−
(∑t
r=s−M
)
mr,s−r(ηs)
]]
≤ E
[
e
∑M
s=t+1
[
ηs−
(∑t−1
r=s−M
)
mr,s−r(ηs)
]]
.
For any i ≤M we have:
eλi(E[mt,i(ηt+i)])E
[
e
ηt+i−
(∑t
r=t+i−M
)
mr,t+i−r(ηt+i)
]
≤ eλi(E[mt,i(ηt+i)])E
[
e
ηt+i−
(∑t−1
r=t+i−M
)
mr,t+i−r(ηt+i) − eη−M×mmt,i (ηt+i)
]
≤
≤ eλi(E[mt,i(ηt+i)])E
eηt+i−
(∑t−1
r=t+i−M
)
mr,t+i−r(ηt+i)
(1− eη−M×m
E [eη]
E [mt,i (ηt+i)]
)
≤
≤ eλi(E[mt,i(ηt+i)])E
eηt+i−
(∑t−1
r=t+i−M
)
mr,t+i−r(ηt+i)
 e− eη−M×mE[eη ] E[mt,i(ηt+i)] ≤
≤ E
eηt+i−
(∑t−1
r=t+i−M
)
mr,t+i−r(ηt+i)
 ,
where the first inequality follows from the Mean Value Theorem.
E. Proofs of Lemmas
Proof of Lemma 2: Let
Ps((bt)t≤T ) = e
∑s
n=1 jn(bn),
Ss((bt)t≤T ) =
T∑
n=s
e
∑n
m=1 jm(bm) =
T∑
n=s
Pn((bt)t≤T ),
for any s ≤ T . For the rest of the proof, fix an argument sequence (bt)t≤T . We will evaluate
all the functions at this sequence, and consequently economize on notation by dropping the
argument of Ss, Ps and js.
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For unit vectors er and es, r ≥ s, consider the derivatives of the function I:
∂I
∂es
= j′sSs,
∂2I
∂er∂es
= j′sj
′
rSr + 1r=sj
′′
sSs.
Therefore, for a fixed vector y = (yt)t≤T the second derivative in the direction y = (yt)t≤T is:
∂2I
∂y∂y
=
T∑
s=1
T∑
r=1
ysyr
∂2I
∂es∂er
= 2
T∑
s=1
∑
r≥s
ysyrj
′
sj
′
rSr +
T∑
s=1
y2sj
′′
sSs. (E.7)
We will bound the expression in (E.7). For this purpose note that for any s ≤ T and
q ≤ T − s we have:
Ss+q =
T∑
n=s+q
Pn ≤ eq sup jt
T∑
n=s
Pn = e
q sup jtSs,
It follows that for ψ = sup jt
2
:∑
r≥s
Sre
−ψ(r−s) ≤ CSs,
∑
s,r≥s
Sry
2
re
ψ(r−s) =
∑
r
y2rSr
∑
s≤r
eψ(r−s) ≤ C
∑
s
Ssy
2
s , (E.8)
where:
C =
T∑
n=0
enψ. (E.9)
Consequently, for any vector z=(zt)t≤T , zt ∈ R:
∑
s,r≥s
zszrSr =
∑
s
zs
∑
r≥s
√
Srzre
ψ
2
(r−s)
√
Sre
−ψ
2
(r−s) ≤
∑
s
zs
(∑
r≥s
Srz
2
re
ψ(r−s)
)1/2(∑
r≥s
Sre
−ψ(r−s)
)1/2
(E.10)
≤
√
C
∑
s
zs
√
Ss
(∑
r≥s
Srz
2
re
ψ(r−s)
)1/2
≤
√
C
(∑
s
z2sSs
)1/2(∑
s
(∑
r≥s
Srz
2
re
ψ(r−s)
))1/2
≤ C
(∑
s
z2sSs
)1/2(∑
s
Ssz
2
s
)1/2
= C
∑
s
z2sSs,
where the first and third inequalities follow from the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality, and C is
as in (E.9).
Therefore, using both (E.7) and (E.10) we obtain:
∂2I
∂y∂y
≤
T∑
s=1
y2s
(
2Cj′2s + j
′′
s
)
Ss,
establishing the Lemma.
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Proof of Lemma 3: To show that I ((xt)t≤L) is jointly concave in leisure (xt)t≤L we use Lemma
2: with bt = xt and:
js(xs) = (θs − φθs+1) (f(xs)− a∗s) + ln ρ, (E.11)
Since
f ′(xs) =
−1
g′(f(xs))
, f ′′(xs) =
−g′′(f(xs))
g′3(f(xs))
,
and we have assumed that θs − φθs+1 ≥ 0, the condition (A.19) is satisfied if g has suffi ciently
high curvature.
Proof of Lemma 4: We must verify condition (A.19) in Lemma 2:
for bt = xt and js defined as:
js(xs) = (θs − φθs+1) (f(xs)− γa∗s) +Ds,
for Ds = (1− γ)ks + lnE
(
e(1−γ)θses
)
+ ln ρ+ (1− γ)
(
g
(
a∗s−1
)
+ g (a∗s)
)
. The rest of the proof
follows as in the γ = 1 case, with the derivatives of the f function being:
f ′(xs) = −D
1
xsg′(f(xs))
, f ′′(xs) =
1
x2sg
′2(f(xs))
(
Dg′(f(xs))−D2
g′′(f(xs))
g′(f(xs))
)
,
for D = γ
1−γ sign(1− γ). Consequently I
′((xt)t≤L) is jointly concave.
Proof of Lemma 6: Let Ut(ηt; η′t) be the CEO’s continuation utility after history ηt if the agent
reports ηt−1, η
′
t. (E.3) follows from the standard envelope conditions, i.e.,
∂
∂η′t
Ut(ηt; η
′
t)|η′t=ηt = 0
together with:
Ut(ηt; η
′
t) = Ut(ηt−1, η
′
t) + g(at(ηt−1, η
′
t))− g(at(ηt−1, η′t) + η′t − ηt), for γ = 1,
Ut(ηt; η
′
t) = Ut(ηt−1, η
′
t) +
yt(ηt−1, η
′
t)
1−γ [e−g(at(ηt−1,η′t)+η′t−ηt)(1−γ) − e−g(at(ηt−1,η′t))(1−γ)]
1− γ . for γ 6= 1.
The technical assumptions on at(ηt−1, ·) guarantee that Ut(ηt−1, ·) is absolutely continuous
(see EG for details). yt(ηt) > 0 follows from PS, since the marginal utility of consumption at
zero is infinite.
Proof of Lemma 7: Note that if instead of U#t (ηt−1, ·) and ζ(ηt−1, ·) we solve for the functions
U#t (ηt−1, ·) and ζ(ηt−1, ·) that satisfy U
#
t (ηt−1, η) = Ut(ηt−1, η) and
U#t (ηt−1, ηt) = U
#
t (ηt−1, η) +
∫ ηt
η
[ζ(ηt−1, x)yt(ηt−1, x)e
−g(a)]1−γg′(a)dx, (E.12)
U#t (ηt−1, ηt)− Ut(ηt−1, ηt) = g(at(ηt−1, ηt))− g(a) + ln ζ(ηt−1, ηt), forγ = 1.
U#t (ηt−1, ηt)
Ut(ηt−1, ηt)
=
[ζ(ηt−1, ηt)yt(ηt−1, ηt)e
−g(a)]1−γ
[yt(ηt−1, ηt)e
−g(at(ηt−1,ηt))]1−γ
, for γ 6= 1,
then we have ζ(ηt−1, ηt) ≤ ζ(ηt−1, ηt) (and ζ(ηt−1, ηt) = ζ(ηt−1, ηt) when t = L). Therefore it
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will be suffi cient to Et−1
[
ζ(ηt−1, ηt)
]
.
Since ηt−1 is fixed, to economize on notation we write Ut(ηt) instead of Ut(ηt−1, ηt) etc.
Case γ 6= 1. We have:
U#t (ηt) = U
#
t (η) +
∫ ηt
η
U#t (x)
Ut(x)
[
yt(x)e
−g(at(x))
]1−γ
g′(at(x))
g′(a)
g′(at(x))
dx,
Ut(ηt) = U
#
t (η) +
∫ ηt
η
[
yt(x)e
−g(at(x))
]1−γ
g′(at(x))dx.
Therefore:(
U#t (ηt)
Ut(ηt)
)′
=
=
U#t (ηt)
Ut(ηt)
[
yt(ηt)e
−g(at(ηt))
]1−γ
g′(at(ηt))
g′(a)
g′(at(ηt))
Ut(ηt)−
[
yt(ηt)e
−g(at(ηt))
]1−γ
g′(at(ηt))U
#
t (ηt)
Ut(ηt)2
=
=
U#t (ηt)
[
yt(ηt)e
−g(at(ηt))
]1−γ
g′(at(ηt))
[
g′(a)
g′(at(ηt))
− 1
]
Ut(ηt)2
≤ U
#
t (ηt)
Ut(ηt)
(1− γ)g′(a)
[
g′(a)
g′(at(ηt))
− 1
]
for γ < 1,
It follows that:
U#t (ηt)
Ut(ηt)
≤ e(1−γ)g
′(a)
∫ ηt
η
(
g′(a)
g′(at(x))
−1
)
dx ≤ e(1−γ) sup
g′(a)
f
Et−1
(
g′(a)
g′(at(x))
−1
)
≤ e(1−γ)g
′(a) sup g
′′
fg′2Et−1[a−at(ηt)], for γ < 1.
(E.13)
where the last inequality follows because g
′(a)
g′(a) = g
′(a)
[
1
g′(a) + (a− a)
g′′(xa+(1−x)a)
g′2(xa+(1−x)a)
]
for some
x ∈ [0, 1]. For γ > 1 we obtain the analogous chain with the inequality signs reversed. Thus,
Et−1
[
ζ(ηt)
]
= Et−1
[U#t (ηt)
Ut(ηt)
] 1
1−γ
e[g(a)−g(at(ηt))](1−γ)
 ≤ (E.14)
≤ eg
′(a) sup g
′′
fg′2Et−1[a−at(ηt)]Et−1
[
e[g(a)−g(at(ηt))](1−γ)
]
≤
≤ eg
′(a) sup g
′′
fg′2Et−1[a−at(ηt)]
(
1 + 1γ<1e
g(a)−g(a)(1− γ)g′(a)Et−1 [a− at(ηt)]
)
.
Case γ = 1. Comparing (E.3) and (E.12) we immediately obtain:
ln ζ(ηt) =
∫ ηt
η
(
g′(a)
g′(at(x))
− 1
)
g′(at(x))dx+ g(a)− g(at(ηt)).
Using the analogous bounds as in (E.13) and (E.14) we obtain:
Et−1
[
ζ(ηt)
]
≤ Et−1
[
e
g′(a)
∫ ηt
η
(
g′(a)
g′(at(x))
−1
)
dx+g(a)−g(at(x))
]
≤ eg
′(a) sup g
′′
fg′2Et−1[a−at(ηt)]Et−1
[
eg(a)−g(at(ηt))
]
≤
≤ eg
′(a) sup g
′′
fg′2Et−1[a−at(ηt)]
(
1 + eg(a)−g(a)g′(a)Et−1 [a− at(ηt)]
)
.
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Proof of Lemma 8: Multiplying all payoffs by ζ results in all the continuation utilities Ut(ηt)
and deviation continuation utilities Ut(ηt; η
′
t) multiplied by constant ζ
1−γ for γ 6= 1, or having
a constant ln ζ ×
∑L−t
s=0 ρ
s added at time t, for γ = 1, and so EF is unaffected. This also results
in the marginal utilities of current consumption multiplied by ζ−γ, and so PS is also unaffected.
Proof of Lemma 9: We prove only the γ 6= 1 case. For the ζ as in the proof of Lemma (7:)
we have:
Et−1
[
mu#t (ηt−1, ηt)
mut(ηt−1, ηt)
]
≥ Et−1
[
ζ
−γ
(ηt−1, ηt−1)× e(1−γ)(g(a(ηt−1,ηt))−g(a))
]
=
= Et−1
[U#t (ηt−1, ηt)
Ut(ηt−1, ηt)
] −γ
1−γ
e−γ(1−γ)[g(a)−g(at(ηt−1,ηt))] × e(1−γ)(g(at(ηt−1,ηt))−g(a))
 =
≥ e−γg
′(a) sup g
′′
fg′2Et−1[a−at(ηt)]Et−1
[
e−(1+γ)(1−γ)[g(a)−g(at(ηt−1,ηt))]
]
≥
≥ e−γg
′(a) sup g
′′
fg′2Et−1[a−at(ηt)]
(
1− 1γ<1e−(1+γ)(1−γ)[g(a)−g(a)]g′(a)(1− γ)(1 + γ)Et−1 [a− at(ηt)]
)
.
Proof of Lemma 10: We prove only the γ 6= 1 case. From (E.3) it follows that for every ηt
and η′t :
e(η−η)g
′(a) × yht (ηt−1, ηt)1−γe−(1−γ)g(a
h
t (ηt−1,ηt)) ≥ yht (ηt−1, η′t)1−γe−(1−γ)g(a
h
t (ηt−1,η
′
t)),
and so for every ηt and η′t :
yh(ηt−1, η
′
t)
−γeγg(a
h
t (ηt−1,η
′
t)) ≥ e−|
γ
1−γ |(η−η)g′(a) × yht (ηt−1, ηt)−γeγg(a
h(ηt−1,ηt)),
Et−1
[
muht (ηt−1, ηt)
]
≥ e−|
γ
1−γ |(η−η)g′(a)+g(a)−g(a) ×max
x
muht (ηt−1, x).
It follows that for D2 = e|
γ
1−γ |(η−η)g′(a)+g(a)−g(a),
Et−1
[
mult(ηt−1, ηt)
]
Et−1
[
muht (ηt−1, ηt)
] ≥ Et−1 [muht (ηt−1, ηt)]
(
1−D2 ×
(
1− Et−1
[
mult(ηt−1,ηt)
muht (ηt−1,ηt)
]))
Et−1
[
muht (ηt−1, ηt)
] =
= 1−D2 ×
(
1− Et−1
[
mult(ηt−1, ηt)
muht (ηt−1, ηt)
])
.
Proof of Lemma 11: Let Y 0 be the payoff scheme Y x. For any n, 0 < n < L, we construct the
payoff scheme Y n as follows. Start with the payoff scheme Y n−1. After any history ηn multiply
the payoffs at time n by ζn,ps(ηn) > 1 so that PS at history ηn is satisfied; then multiply the
payoffs after any history ηm, m ≥ n and ηm|n = ηn, by ζn,pu(ηn) < 1 so that the continuation
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utility at history ηn remains unchanged. After any history ηn−1 multiply the payoffs at time
n − 1 by ζn,ps(ηn−1) > 1 so that PS at ηn−1 is satisfied; then multiply the payoffs after any
history ηm, m ≥ n− 1 and ηm|n−1 = ηn−1, by ζn,pu(ηn−1) < 1 so that the continuation utility
at ηn−1 remains unchanged. Follow this procedure until histories at time 1, and let Y
n be the
resulting payoff scheme. One can inductively show that ζn,pu(ηm)× ζn,ps(ηm) ≥ 1, m ≤ n.
Let A∗ always require the high effort. Lemma 8:
yields that each contract (A∗, Y n) satisfies EF and also PS up to round n. Let Y ∗ = Y L−1.
It remains to prove (E.6).
For any history ηL we have y
∗
L(ηL) = y
x
L(ηL)×
∏L−1
m=1
∏L−1
n=m ζ
n,pu(ηL|m) ≤ yxL(ηL) and so the
condition (E.6) is satisfied.
For any history ηt, t < L, we have, by construction above:
mu∗t (ηt)
muxt (ηt)
=
(
t∏
m=1
L−1∏
n=m
ζn,pu(ηt|m)×
L−1∏
n=t
ζn,ps(ηt)
)−γ
≥
(
L−1∏
n=t
ζn,ps(ηt)
)−γ
.
Moreover,
ζt,ps(ηt)
−γ =
Et
[
muxt+1(ηt−1, ηt)
]
Et
[
mut+1(ηt−1, ηt)
] ≥ φ(Et [muxt+1(ηt−1, ηt)
mut+1(ηt−1, ηt)
])
≥
≥ φ (ψ (Et [a− at+1(ηt+1)])) ,
where the first inequality follows from Lemma 10:, and the second one from Lemma 9:. By
the same logic, for any n, t < n ≤ L− 1,
ζn,ps(ηt)
−γ =
Et
[
munt+1(ηt, ηt+1)
]
Et
[
mun−1t+1 (ηt, ηt+1)
] ≥ φ(Et [munt+1(ηt, ηt+1)
mun−1t+1 (ηt, ηt+1)
])
≥ φ
(
Et
[
ζn,ps(ηt, ηt+1)
−γ])
= φ
(
Et
[
Et+1
[
munt+2(ηt, ηt+1, ηt+2)
]
Et+1
[
mun−1t+2 (ηt, ηt+1, ηt+2)
]]) ≥ φ(Et [φ(Et+1 [munt+2(ηt, ηt+1, ηt+2)
mun−1t+2 (ηt, ηt+1, ηt+2)
])])
= φ2
(
Et
[
munt+2(ηt, ηt+1, ηt+2)
mun−1t+2 (ηt, ηt+1, ηt+2)
])
≥ ... ≥ φn−t
(
Et
[
munn(ηt, ηt+1, ..., ηn)
mun−1n (ηt, ηt+1, ..., ηn)
])
≥ φn−t
(
Et
[
ζn,ps(ηt, ηt+1, ..., ηn)
−γ]) = φn−t(Et [En [muxn+1(ηt, ηt+1, ..., ηn+1)]
En [mun+1(ηt, ηt+1, ..., ηn+1)]
])
≥ φn−t+1 (Et [ψ (En [a− an+1(ηt, ηt+1, ..., ηn+1)])]) .
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